

PROPAGANDA MEDIA ON JAVA UNDER THE JAPANESE 1942-1945

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One major impact of the Japanese occupation on the Javanese people was the introduction and development of new media for political propaganda. In order to carry out their policies smoothly in occupied Java, the Japanese military government paid great attention to how to "grasp people's minds" (*minshin ha'aku*) and how to "propagate and tame them" (*senbu kōsaku*). They considered it indispensable for their war effort to mobilize the whole society (total mobilization) and entirely change the people's mentality. Believing that Indonesians had to be completely molded into a Japanese pattern of behavior and thinking, they aimed their propaganda at indoctrinating the Indonesian people so that they could become dependable partners in the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.

To put their propaganda schemes into operation various media were employed, such as newspapers, pamphlets, books, posters, photographs, broadcasting, exhibitions, speech, drama, traditional arts performances, paper picture shows (*kamishibai*), music, and movies. A striking characteristic of wartime Japanese propaganda was its use of media that would mainly appeal to a person's "auditory and visual" sense. Especially highly promoted were movies, performing arts, *kamishibai*, and music. The Japanese considered such media as the most effective means for influencing the uneducated and illiterate rural people, who constituted the great part of the Javanese population. The Japanese were aware that written media such as newspapers, books, magazines, and pamphlets, might have some limited effect with regard to educated urban dwellers, but were totally useless in the rural society.

I. BASIC FRAMEWORK OF JAPANESE PROPAGANDA POLICY

(1) *Sendenbu*

It can be said that propaganda was, from the very beginning of the occupation, one of the most vital tasks of the military government. Its importance was such that, in order to manage propaganda affairs, an independent department, "Sendenbu" was set up within the military government (Gunseikanbu). Established in August 1942 it was in charge of propaganda and information concerning civil administration, and was a separate organ from the Information Section of the 16th Army which was in charge of propaganda and information concerning military operations.¹ In other words, Sendenbu activities were directed towards the civilian population of Java, including Indonesian, Eurasian, Asiatic minorities, and Japanese, while the Information Section of the 16th Army carried out propaganda vis-à-vis Japanese soldiers and Allied prisoners-of-war, and also, through overseas broadcasts, vis-à-vis civilians in countries opposed to Japan.

1. Towards the end of the war, in April 1945, however, these two separate offices were amalgamated, into a single new office which carried out both military and civil propaganda.

Although Sendenbu activities were confined to civilian affairs in Indonesia, Japanese authorities never trusted control of this important department to civilian hands. It was always headed by an army officer, first Colonel Machida (August 1942–October 1943), then Major Adachi (October 1943–March 1945), and lastly Colonel Takahashi (April–August 1945).² And out of the three sections of the department, namely (a) the Administration Section; (b) the News & Press Section; and (c) the Propaganda Section, only (c) was headed by a civilian official, while military officers with the rank of lieutenant or second lieutenant headed the other two.³

At a very early stage the Sendenbu acted not only as an administration office, but it directly executed propaganda operations. As the structure of military administration became more complicated, however, several specialized bureaus in charge of different propaganda fields were set up as extra-departmental bodies of Sendenbu, and execution of propaganda operations was entrusted to them. Table 1 shows the names and the operational fields of those organizations.

Table 1
Name of Propaganda Organization

name of organization	date of establishment	function
Jawa Shinbunkai (Java Newspaper Corporation)	Dec. 1942	publishing newspapers (management was trusted to Asahi Shinbun)
Dōmei News Agency		reporting
Jawa Hōsō Kanrikyoku (Jawa Broadcasting Superintendent Bureau)	Oct. 1942	domestic broadcasting (management was trusted to N.H.K., Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
Jawa Engeki Kyōkai (Java Theatrical Play Association)		making of theatrical plays
Nihon Eigasha or Nichi'eī (Japan Motion Picture Company)	April 1943	producing movies
Eiga Haikyūsha or Eihai (Motion Picture Distributing Company)	April 1943	distributing movies

2. Adachi, Ōhashi, Yoshikawa & Tsuda, "Replies of questionnaire concerning Sendenbu" (A report in English submitted by former Sendenbu Director and officials to the Allied Forces after the capitulation of the Japanese Army.) April 14, 1947 Jakarta. This document is now located in the Archives of the Dutch Ministry of Defence in The Hague under the file number GG21-1947 *Japan's Marine Archief, deel I*.

3. After the amalgamation of the former Information Section of the 16th Army and Sendenbu in April 1945, military control of propaganda activity was further strengthened, and five sections of this new office were headed by military officers. ("Replies of questionnaire concerning Sendenbu.")

In addition to these, an organization named Keimin Bunka Shidōsho or Poesat Keboedajaan (Popular Education and Cultural Direction Center) was set up in April 1943 as an auxiliary organization of Sendenbu. Its main tasks were: (a) to promote traditional Indonesian arts; (b) to introduce and disseminate Japanese culture; and (c) to educate and train Indonesian artists. Under the director of Sendenbu, it consisted of five sections, each headed by an Indonesian, namely (a) administration, (b) literature, (c) music, (d) fine arts, (e) performance arts (theatrical plays, dance, and film). In each section Indonesian specialists (writers, poets, musical composers, painters, sculptors, scenario writers, and movie directors etc.) worked as full-time staff, and Sendenbu sent Japanese instructors to train them.⁴

After establishment of those specialized organizations and bureaus, Sendenbu itself no longer executed direct propaganda activities. It only produced propaganda plans and materials, and distributed them to the relevant working units.⁵ Nevertheless, it continued to exercise great influence over the subsidiary organizations, playing the role of general headquarters for supervising and coordinating various fields of propaganda operations.

(2) Local Propaganda Organizations

The main concern of the military government was how to expand their propaganda network to every nook and cranny of Javanese urban and rural life. From the very early stages of the occupation Japanese propaganda staff were sent out to the principal cities on Java (Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Semarang, and Surabaya) to carry out propaganda activities, and later,⁶ a more elaborate and well-organized local body, called the District Operation Unit (Chihō Kōsakutai), was established in six large cities, namely Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, and Malang. Each of these units was responsible for three to four residencies as follows:⁷

Jakarta District Operation Unit:

Banten, Jakarta, Bogor, Jakarta Special City;

Bandung District Operation Unit:

Priangan, Cirebon, Banyumas;

Yogyakarta District Operation Unit:

Yogyakarta (Principality), Surakarta (Principality), Madiun, Kedu;

4. Jawa Gunseikanbu, *Jawa Nenkan*, 1944 (Jakarta, 1944), pp. 167-68, and *Djawa Baroe*, No. 8, April 1, 1943, pp. 8-10.

5. "Replies of questionnaire concerning Sendenbu."

6. It was not clear when these local units were officially established. Sendenbu Director, Colonel Adachi, reported that it was after February 1944 and stated that the Jakarta unit was set up in August 1944 and the Malang branch in October 1944. But mention had already been made of the activities of Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta and Surabaya units in "Sendenbu Monthly Report" No. 22, December 1943 (translated into English as Captured Enemy Publication No. 211 by Allied Intelligence Office and now found at the Public Record Office in London under the file No. W.O.208/2483); while *Asia Raya* reported establishment of all of those units in its May 16, 1944 issue.

7. "Replies of questionnaire concerning Sendenbu."

Semarang District Operation Unit:
Semarang, Pekalongan, Pati;

Surabaya District Operation Unit:
Surabaya, Bojonegoro, Madura;

Malang District Operation Unit:
Malang, Kediri, Besuki.

In addition to these District Operation Units, which were under direct control of Sendenbu, each residency office had its own propaganda and information section. At least one member of staff in this section was a Japanese, sent from Jakarta exclusively to perform this function. At the lower administrative levels, such as the regency and sub-district, there were also officials in charge of propaganda. In many cases, however, these officials were not working exclusively on propaganda, but concurrently carried on other functions as local government employees. These local government propaganda activities were under the control of the director of the Department of General Affairs (Sōmubu) of the military government in Jakarta, and had no institutional relation with Sendenbu. Nor did the Sendenbu District Operation Units deliver the orders from their Jakarta headquarters to residency offices. Those two local propaganda networks existed separately, although they often cooperated with each other in their actual operations.⁸

(3) *Profile of the Propagandist*

In recruiting both the central and local propaganda staff, the Japanese military government was very careful to choose talented persons. As mentioned above, the very top positions in the central office were usually occupied by military officers. And the highest position held by a civilian was the chief of the Propaganda Section (*Sendenka-chō*), who was actually the top man in charge of daily propaganda activities. This post was assigned to an experienced and talented Japanese official, named Shimizu Hitoshi. A professional propagandist (*senden-kan*) who had passed the government examination, he started his career as a propagandist in China in the 1930s. In Peking he was engaged in programs for indoctrinating the Chinese people through a Japanese-guided mass organization, called Shinminkai. After working for a couple of years in China he returned to Japan in 1940 and continued to work in a similar field as a leading staff member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), a government-guided mass organization which later became the model for Jawa Hōkōkai. He later quit this organization to join a newly established Cabinet Information Bureau (Naikaku Jōhōkyoku) until recruited by the 16th Army as an attached civilian in charge of propaganda.⁹

Under Shimizu many other talented Japanese worked as Sendenbu officials. They can be divided into two categories: first, those who were, like Shimizu, propaganda experts and who were mostly engaged in planning the programs. Second were the specialists in a particular field of arts, such as writers, essayists, musicians, painters, caricaturists, and designers who were generally called *bunka-jin* (culture men) in Japanese society. These were mostly engaged in composing propaganda materials and carrying out the actual propaganda opera-

8. "Replies of questionnaire concerning Sendenbu."

9. Interview with Shimizu (Tokyo), February 1980.

tions, together with their Indonesian counterparts. Quite a few first-class and well-known Japanese *bunka-jin* had been sent to Java,¹⁰ which indicates how keenly the Japanese authorities were aware of the importance of propaganda in the occupied area.

The Indonesian staff of Sendenbu can also be divided into the above-mentioned two categories. The first group of Indonesians were recruited on the basis of such attributes as their prewar career, political orientation, position in traditional society, charismatic and stirring personalities, and ability in speech making. As for their previous occupation, school teachers were particularly preferred. And those who had some experience in the anti-Dutch movement were warmly welcomed. Mr. Muhammad Yamin, the *Sanyo* (Advisor) for Sendenbu, was a typical example: he had been active in the anti-Dutch nationalist movement as a member of Indonesia Muda and Partindo, and, at the same time, had worked as a school teacher.¹¹ Among the other staff of Sendenbu was Sitti Noerdjannah, a woman who had taught in an Islamic School and had been active in Islamic movements.¹² Chairul Saleh and Sukarni, radical youths who later played important roles in the Indonesian independence struggle, were also Sendenbu officials. Though still young and inexperienced at that time, their potential character as agitators and their strong fighting spirit must have attracted Japanese attention. Besides those generalists there were also Indonesian writers and artists working for Sendenbu, including Raden Mas Soeroso (painter) and Iton Lasmana (designer in charge of advertisements). Many other well-known writers, musicians, and painters worked for Keimim Bunka Shidōsho, among them Sanusi Pane (writer), Armijn Pané (writer), Utojo (musician), Simanjuntak (musician), Raden Koesbini (musician), Raden Agoes Djajasasoemita (painter), and Djauhar Arifin Soetomo (essayist & drama writer).¹³

In considering the local propagandists, the case of the Yogyakarta Principality can be taken as an example. The personnel composition of the District Operation Unit was more or less the same as that of the central office in Jakarta. It was headed by a civilian Japanese and under him were many propagandists, both Japanese and Indonesian. The Japanese staff were usually responsible for planning and supervising, while Indonesians mostly worked on carrying out the propaganda operations. There were nine full-time Indonesian staff members in the Yogyakarta Unit, i.e., two *kamishibai* (paper picture show) operators, four *manzai* (a comic stage dialogue) talkers, and three persons in

10. Among them were Ōya Sōichi (writer), Ono Saseo (caricaturist), Yokoyama Ryūichi (caricaturist), Minami Seizen (painter), Iida Nobuo (music composer), Ōki Atsuo (poet), Takeda Rintarō (writer), Kurata Bunjin (movie director), and Hinatsu Eitarō (movie director). It is said that Hinatsu, a Korean by origin, stayed in Indonesia even after the Japanese surrender and contributed to film making and drama directing under the Indonesian name, Dr. Huyung. In 1948 he set up Cine Drama Instituut in Yogyakarta. Misbach Jusa Biran, Matsuno Akihisa trans. "Indonesia Eiga Shōshi" [Short History of Indonesia] in Satō, Shirai, Shimizu and Richie, *Eiga ga Ōsama no Kuni* (Tokyo: Hanashi no Tokushū, 1982), p. 210, n. 10. And Salim Said, *Profil Dunia Film Indonesia* [The Profile of the Film World in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1982), p. 39.

11. Jawa Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia Jang Terkemoeke di Djawa* (Jakarta: Gunseikanbu, 1944), p. 472. Hereafter, this will be referred to as *Terkemoeke*.

12. Ibid., p. 476.

13. *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 168, and *Terkemoeke*, p. 427.

charge of censorship. Two were former school teachers: Besut Hadiwardoyo, who had been recruited as a *kamishibai* operator, had lost his job as a teacher when his school was closed down at the beginning of the Japanese occupation, and had then applied for this new job in propaganda. Prior to being accepted he was taken, together with other applicants, to the market, where he was ordered to make a speech in Javanese on the spot. Apparently this was a test, and he, together with a tailor named Zainuddin, passed it. As a result he was given a full-time post in the Yogyakarta Operation Unit. According to Besut, one of the most important criteria applied in selecting the candidates was their speech-making skill.¹⁴ Siswosumarto was also a former school teacher. Towards the end of the Dutch period he lost his job because of his political activity in Partindo, and was unemployed when the Japanese came. Seeing a recruiting advertisement he applied for the propaganda office and was accepted after taking a language exam.¹⁵

Besides those full-time staff members the local propaganda unit usually employed a large number of informal and part-time cooperators who would help occasionally with particular requests. Generally speaking, local political leaders, religious leaders, singers, musicians, actors, *dalang* (conductor of *wayang kulit* or shadow puppet plays), dancers, and clowns, etc., were often mobilized for propaganda operations. Japanese propaganda authorities were adept at taking advantage of these entertainers' fame and talent in order to attract popular interest. Among such cooperators in Yogyakarta were Begel Tombong (clown), Kadarja (actress of the traditional *ketoprak* drama), Bagio (clown and actor of *ketoprak*), and Mangun Ngoro (*dalang*).¹⁶

Furthermore, the unit enlisted help from many other ordinary citizens and villagers to back up the propaganda operations of the entertainers.¹⁷ For example, in Gunung Kidul Regency in Yogyakarta, five local assistants, chosen from each district (*gun*) and called *pemimpin tonarigumi* (neighborhood association leaders),¹⁸ were officially appointed to help propaganda activities by the Propaganda Section of the Yogyakarta Kōchi Jimukyoku (Principality Office) and were given a monthly allowance. At such grass-roots levels the operations of the Sendenbu network and of the local government were often combined, with no clear distinction between them. These five cooperators continued their own occupations even after their appointment, and whenever there was any direction from Yogyakarta, whether from the Sendenbu unit or the principality government, they carried it out. In choosing the cooperators the important criteria were

14. Interview with Besut Hadiwardoyo (Yogyakarta), November 9, 1980. After January 1945 he was active in radio broadcasting, and even at the time of the writer's interview he was a well-known radio entertainer in Yogyakarta. This shows that he is an extraordinarily talented speaker, and the Japanese propaganda officials in Yogyakarta did not fail to discover this talent.

15. Interview with Siswosumarto (Yogyakarta), November 12, 1980.

16. Ibid.

17. According to Shimizu Hitoshi, Sendenbu tried to have at least one informal cooperator in every 20-30 households both in urban and rural society. (Interview with Shimizu I.)

18. This unique position apparently was the creation of Selosoemardjan who was in charge of penetrating tonarigumi in Yogyakarta. The post was higher than *azachō* and there was only one in each district (*gun*).

their popularity, learning, and trust in the society. Out of the five in Yogyakarta, one was an Islamic teacher, one an official in the sanitary section of the regency office, and one a dairy farmer.¹⁹

Besides these paid cooperators, there were also unpaid volunteers. In the Yogyakarta regency one of these volunteers was a sub-district (*son*) agricultural official who was in charge of promoting cotton planting (*mandor kapas*). Because he himself was a good traditional dance performer and had close personal relations with many other artists and entertainers, he often arranged the Yogyakarta propaganda performances in his area.²⁰

Lastly, mention should be made of Japanese volunteers who engaged in grass-roots level propaganda. One example are the thirty-three volunteer propagandists in Cirebon residency, who were chosen by the Resident (*shūchōkan*) from among Japanese civilians. Each of them was assigned to one sub-district (*son*), and actually living in the area, they were assigned to giving information and guidance to the local inhabitants on a daily basis.²¹

The Sendenbu set up a training school in Jakarta for its propagandists, which, according to the "Sendenbu Monthly Report" of December 1943, was opened on November 15, 1943. Although no details are known about this training school, it seems to have offered a short-term course for both full-time staff and informal cooperators, and many different delegations were successively trained there.²²

There was also a Hōkōkai-sponsored course which, according to *Asia Raya* (June 16, 1945), started on June 12, 1945 in Jakarta. Unfortunately no further information is available about it.

(4) *Scheme and Media of Propaganda*

The *Gunseikan*, the head of the military government, was responsible for deciding on the basic propaganda program for each fiscal year, in accordance with the general plan drawn up by the Southern General Army (*Nanpō Sogun*) Headquarters. Then, on receiving the order from the *Gunseikan*, the Sendenbu director made out the operative plan in consultation with the section chiefs.²³ All the concerned organizations and the District Operation Unit were then informed of this plan. At each stage of the occupation the main propaganda themes were changed to accord with the shift in the military administration's basic policies.

19. Interview with Pawirosumarta, one of those former *pemimpin tonarigumi* (Playen, Gunung Kidul), October 22, 1980.

20. Interview with this *mandor kapas*, Suko (Karangmojo, Gunung Kidul), November 1, 1980.

21. *Jawa Shinbun*, November 5, 1944.

22. A teacher from a *pesantren* (private religious school teaching the Kor'an) in Jember, K. Zanuri, who had been appointed a propaganda official in this regency, has stated that he was sent to Jakarta for fifteen days in 1945 to be trained as propagandist after once being trained at the *Alim-ulama* (Moslem teacher) Training Course. Interview with K. Zanuri.

23. "Replies of questionnaire concerning Sendenbu."

The most usual method of putting the propaganda schemes into operation was to send out a team of propagandists, consisting of movie projectionists, musicians, *kamishibai* operators, and drama players, to travel from village to village, performing in each. Before the performances began, there was usually a speech from either a Sendenbu official or a prominent local leader, generally before a large audience, because free admission to dramas and movies attracted thousands of spectators.

The government's political messages were also usually woven in a subtle way, into the entertainments following the speech but, however strong their political flavor, those performances were welcomed enthusiastically by the villagers, who were always thirsty for amusements.

Of all the propaganda media, movies seem to have had the biggest impact on rural society, both in terms of scale (quantity) and content, so in the following sections major attention will be paid to describing these films. There will, however, also be a brief consideration of dramas, paper-picture shows, *wayang* (shadow play), songs, and radio broadcasting.

II. MOVIE PROPAGANDA

One of the most important wartime propaganda media was the movie, which prior to World War II had never been used as a tool of political indoctrination in Indonesia. The policies concerning production, distribution, and screening of movies in occupied Java were copies of those used in wartime Japan, which had gradually been formulated through the 1930s.

(1) *Movie Policy in Japan*

As the war against China gradually escalated and the possibility increased for the outbreak of a world war, Japanese top officials in cultural affairs, aware of the enormous importance and effectiveness of movies as propaganda media, started to exercise a strong grip over the Japanese film industry. After a period of sporadic and fragmentary interference, the government finally established a legal basis for controlling the industry by issuing the "Motion Picture Law (*Eiga Hō*)" in October 1939,²⁴ which is said to have taken the German system as its model.²⁵

One of the most important policies expressed in this law was extension of firm government control over existing film companies. The law prescribed that any movie production and distribution company had to obtain government permission both to start and to continue its business. By this regulation the government could impose silent, but tremendous pressure on movie companies by deliberately withholding permission. The authorities thought that the fewer the companies, the easier they would be to control, and their ultimate intention was to integrate all movie businesses into one single channel. The first step had already been taken in this direction as early as 1935, when the Greater Japan Movie Association (*Dai Nippon Eiga Kyōkai*) was organized as a body to guide and

24. Tanaka Junichirō, *Nihon Eiga Hattatsushi*, Vol. III [Historical Development of Japanese Movies] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron, 1976), pp. 14-15.

25. Lisa Pontecorvo et al., "The Far East and World War II" (unpublished broadcast note of BBC TV program), 1973, pp. 3-4.

manipulate the movie industry.²⁶ Furthermore, starting in October 1940 film production and distribution began to be supervised by the National Culture Council of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), a government-sponsored mass organization.²⁷ Finally government control over the movie industry reached its peak in early 1942 with the formation of a monopoly film distributor, Eiga Haikyūsha or Eihai (Japan Motion Picture Distributing Company) which amalgamated all existing film distributors under government guidance.²⁸ Later, in Java, too, this Eihai was to be in charge of movie distribution.

Another important issue prescribed in the Motion Picture Law of 1939 was regulation of the content of movies by pre-production censorship of the scripts. As the Japanese ultra-nationalistic ideology based on emperor worship was gradually enunciated in a clearer form, government authorities began to develop a concrete idea regarding the "desirable" themes and expressions for wartime movies. These they announced from time to time in the form of "notices" from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.²⁹ Strict censorship was applied in accordance with the principles expressed in these directives.

The Motion Picture Law of 1939 also prescribed compulsory projection of news films and so-called "culture films [*bunka eiga*]" together with entertainment/feature films. Promotion of news and culture films was one of the most conspicuous characteristics of wartime Japanese movie policy. The government considered that such movies were more direct in transmitting government messages to the people and more effective as a means of propaganda. The term, "culture film" or *bunka eiga*, is said to have been a direct translation from German *kulture film* which was promoted under the Hitler regime.³⁰ This term was originally applied to nonfiction educational films giving scientific and cultural information to the people. But the wartime culture films were more or less politically oriented and usually expressed government intentions and desires. News films were as important as culture films, and their production was later put under strict government control. In April 1940 all existing newsfilm makers were amalgamated into a single company named, Nippon Nyūsu Eigasha (Japan News Film Company), which began to edit a weekly newsreel under the title of *Nippon Nyūsu*. It appeared throughout the war up till December 1945, a

26. *Nihon Eiga Hattatsushi*, 3, p. 151. This association was set up under the auspices of the ministries of internal affairs and of education and was headed by Admiral Saitō.

27. Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), Research and Analysis Branch, "Japanese Films; a Phase of Psychological Warfare" (R & A 1307) (Washington D.C., March 30, 1944) (unpublished report) p. 20.

28. *Nihon Eiga Hattatsushi*, pp. 83-85. It is said that this amalgamation was done under the strong leadership of the Cabinet Information Bureau (Naikaku Jōhō-kyoku) and the Greater Japan Movie Association.

29. The first notice was issued soon after the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities in July 1937, then further notices were given in July 1938 and 1940. The content of the latter two notices will be introduced in the following section. For details, see *Sekai no Eiga Sakka No. 31: Nihon Eigashi* [Film Directors of the World No. 31: History of Japanese Film] (Tokyo: Kinema Junpōsha, 1976), pp. 78, 83. Hereafter, it will be referred to as *Nihon Eigashi*.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

total of 254 newsreels.³¹ Quite a few items on occupied Southeast Asia were reported in this news film.³²

In this way the government legally acquired strong control over the film industry. All this positive interference shows how keenly the Japanese authorities were aware of the importance and effectiveness of movies as a part of the operation of psychological warfare.

(2) *Movie Policy in Java*

Basically the same policy was applied in occupied Java. From the very beginning the military government viewed enforcement of total control over the movie industry as an urgent task. As soon as the 16th Army took over in Java, the Sendenbu staff accompanying the military forces confiscated all existing movie companies, and then, in October 1942, they set up a provisional organization to carry out movie policy. This was called Jawa Eiga Kōsha (Java Motion Picture Corporation) and was headed by Ōya Sōichi, a famous Japanese writer who had been employed as a member of the Sendenbu staff.

This temporary measure was, however, soon revised on the basis of *Nanpō Eiga Kōsaku Yōryō* (The Outline on Film Propaganda in Southern Areas) issued in September 1942 by the Tokyo government. This "outline" was aimed at formulating a unified movie policy for all occupied areas in Southeast Asia. It was decided that management of the movie industry in occupied areas should be entrusted to two Japanese corporations, namely Nichi'ei (Japan Motion Picture Company) and Eihai (Motion Picture Distributing Company). Nichi'ei was a film production company, while Eihai was the monopoly film distribution company set up in early 1942 under the sponsorship of the government (see above). Both had head offices in Tokyo. Branches were set up in Java, and thus the movie industry of Java was incorporated into a larger network encompassing the whole area of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere with Tokyo as its center.³³ Upon establishment of the branches of Nichi'ei and Eihai, the above-mentioned Jawa Eiga Kōsha was dissolved.

(3) *Movies Shown in Java*

What kind of movies were shown in Java both for entertainment and propaganda? Prior to the war American films had the biggest share of the Japanese

31. Those films are now available at NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) Service Center in Tokyo. The list and the brief contents of the news were published by this Center in 1980 under the title of *Nippon Nyūsu de Tsuzuru Gekidō no Kiroku: Nippon Nyūsu Senchōhen, Shōwa 15-20* [Record of Upheaval Seen in the Nippon Nyūsu: Nippon Nyūsu During the War 1940-45]. Mainichi Newspaper Company also published a book in 1977, illustrating some of the important scenes (pictures) from those newsreels. It is titled *Nihon Nyūsu Eigashi: Kaisen Zenya Kara Shōsen Chokugo made* [The History of Japanese Newsfilms: from the Eve of Breakout of War to the Immediate Post-war Days].

32. During three and half years of the Japanese occupation, Java appeared in this series of *Nippon Nyūsu* 18 times (6 times in 1942, 7 times in 1943, 4 times in 1944, and once in 1945).

33. *Nihon Eiga Hattatsushi*, p. 116.

movie market constituting about 65 percent of the total movies in 1939. Chinese (12 percent), French (4.8 percent), German (4.5 percent), English (3.4 percent), and Dutch (3.1 percent) films followed in that order. On the other hand, very few Japanese films had been imported to Java (0.2 percent), and domestic movies had made up a very limited share (2.9 percent).³⁴ However, the Japanese occupation brought a complete change to the movie market in Java. Showing films from "enemy" countries was strictly prohibited except for a short period in the very early days of the occupation.³⁵ To replace them a great number of Japanese movies began to be imported. It was officially decided to import 52 items annually. Besides these, it was decided to import 32 Chinese films and 6 from the Axis countries.³⁶ It is doubtful, however, that those Chinese and Axis movies were ever actually brought in. On the other hand, domestic movie production in Java was also strongly encouraged, so that movies seen in Java during the occupation were mostly either imported Japanese films or domestic ones produced in Java.

i. Japanese Movies

The Japanese films were carefully chosen and only those considered particularly useful as propaganda were imported. These were the movies which clearly enunciated desirable moral teaching and political indoctrination which the government intended to transmit to the Javanese population. What, then, was the "desirable" content of wartime movies in the mind of the government in Japan, both for domestic consumption and for export to their occupied territories? As mentioned earlier, the Japanese government announced their official view concerning the content of movies in the form of "notices."

The first clear-cut directive was expressed in July 1938 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs at a meeting in Tokyo with the representatives of scenario writers. This read as follows:³⁷

1. Western-influenced individualistic ideas should be eliminated.
2. Japanese spirit, especially the virtue of the family system should be exalted, and the spirit of self-sacrifice for the benefit of nation and society should be encouraged.
3. Movies should take a positive role in educating the masses in order to discourage Westernization of young people, especially of young women.
4. Frivolous and flippant behavior and utterances should be swept off the screen, and efforts should be made to strengthen respect for elders.

34. "Films censored in 1939" in Netherlands East Indies, Het Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek van het Department van Economische Zaken, *Indisch Verslag 1940* (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1940), p. 130. According to this, the total length of film censored in 1939 was 1,526,708 meters of which only 44,082 meters was domestic film.

35. Nichi'ei Bunka Eigabu [Culture Film Section, Nichi'ei], "Ran'in no Eigakai to Nihon Eiga no Hankyō" [Movie Industry in N.E.I. and Response to Japanese Films], *Eiga Junpō*, April 1, 1942, p. 23.

36. *Nihon Eiga Hattatsushi*, pp. 116-17.

37. *Nihon Eigashi*, p. 83.

Then in 1940 additional directions were given by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These read as follows:³⁸

1. What is desired is a sound screenplay for entertainment with a positive theme.
2. Appearance of comedians and cross-talkers (*manzai-shi*) in movies is not particularly restricted at this stage, but it might be limited if there are excesses.
3. The following should be prohibited
 - * Stories of a petit bourgeois character
 - * Those which describe the happiness of individual persons only
 - * Scenes of a woman smoking
 - * Café scenes (a place for entertainment serving hard liquor)
 - * Frivolous and flippant behavior.
4. It is recommended that films be produced introducing productive sectors of the society, such as rural life.
5. Pre-production script censorship should be strictly carried out and if any problem is found, rewriting will be ordered.

The films which clearly embodied those government intentions were called *kokusaku eiga* (national policy movies) and received special recommendations from the government. In the years 1942-1945 this kind of movie formed a high percentage of the Japanese film market as is shown in Table 2:

Table 2
Share of *Kokusaku Eiga* Produced in Japan during W.W.II

year	number of play-films (excluding <i>samurai</i> films) produced : A	number of "national policy films" : B *	percentage of B to A
1942	52	11	21%
1943	40	14	35%
1944	29	18	62%
1945	15	9	60%

Source: Eiga Kôsha "Nihon Eiga Sakuhin Mokuroku" [List of Japanese play-films] (Tokyo, 1945)

* The films defined as "national policy movie" here are those with the main theme on "war," "counter-espionage," "patriotism," "industry," and "development of new land."

Most of the Japanese movies introduced into Java must have belonged to these "national policy movies." The titles and brief outlines of some of the plots of the movies are listed in Appendix I. In terms of topic, the films can be divided into the following nine categories:

- (a) Those which emphasize friendship between Japan and Asian nations and the pedagogic role of Japan in this. (3), (15), (16), (23),

38. Ibid., p. 83.

- (34) of Appendix I;
- (b) Those encouraging exaltation of patriotism and devotion to the nation. (7), (9), (14), (15), (18), (19), (28), (29), (35), (36), (38), (50);
 - (c) Those describing military operations and emphasizing the strength of Japanese military forces. (1), (2), (10), (11), (12), (21), (24), (25), (26), (27), (32), (40), (51);
 - (d) Those emphasizing the evil of Western nations. (6), (13), (34);
 - (e) Those emphasizing a moral based on Japanese values, such as self-sacrifice, motherly love, respect to elders, sincere friendship, modesty of women, diligence, and loyalty. (3), (4), (5), (8), (9), (14), (17), (22);
 - (f) Those emphasizing increases in production and other wartime campaigns. (7), (20), (21), (42), (43);
 - (g) Those for instruction and educational purposes. (46), (47), (48), (49);
 - (h) Others. (37), (39), (43);
 - (i) Content unknown. (30), (31), (33), (41), (42), (45).

It is difficult to draw any conclusion on the basis of such a restricted sample, but all the 51 items listed in Appendix I seem to illustrate the general tendencies and character of wartime Japanese films. The themes included in the above categories accord with the analysis of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), the American Intelligence Service during World War II, which, after reviewing the content of twenty recent Japanese movies in March 1944, pointed to the following elements as providing their dominant themes.³⁹

- * filial piety : roughly corresponding to the theme in category (e)
- * faithful wife : roughly corresponding to the theme in category (e)
- * patriotism : roughly corresponding to the theme in category (b)
- * Japan's role in Greater East Asia : roughly corresponding to the theme in category (a)

ii. Movies Produced in Java

It was not until the closing years of Dutch rule that movie making on Java began to be at all a money-making business. In 1941 there were only nine Chinese-owned movie production companies in Java (seven were in Jakarta, one each in Surabaya and Malang).⁴⁰ The number of locally made movies in the Dutch period was very small: the length of domestic film censored in 1939 was only 44,082 meters, which was only a 2.9 percent share of the film market.⁴¹ Table 3 shows the number of film-making companies and films produced during 1936-1941.

39. Ibid.

40. *Profil Dunia Film Indonesia*, p. 28.

41. *Indisch Verslag 1940*, p. 130.

Table 3
The Number of Film-Makers and Films Produced, 1936-1941

Year	Films Produced	Film-makers
1936	2	2
1937	3	2
1938	4	3
1939	4	2
1940	13	7
1941	32	10

Source: *Archipel*, No.5 (1973), pp. 61-62.

The Japanese military government, however, encouraged domestic movie production on a large scale. In September 1942 Jawa Eiga Kōsha started to produce movies at their studio in Jatinegara, which had been confiscated from the Dutch.⁴² After Nippon Eigasha or Nichi'ei has been assigned to operate as a monopoly company in occupied Southeast Asia, it took over the film-making business in Java. An office to supervise all Southeast Asia was set up in Singapore, and a Jakarta branch was opened under it in April 1943. The Jakarta branch was later enlarged and promoted into Jakarta Seisakujo (Jakarta Movie Producing Unit), one of the two units in Southeast Asia which engaged in film making and supplying, while six other branches simply operated as liaison offices and only carried out shooting of news films.⁴³

The Indonesian staff of Nichi'ei was recruited from among former employees of prewar movie production companies, which had all been dissolved by the Japanese. All the key positions were, however, occupied by Japanese staff sent from Tokyo, including Nagano Shichirō (as head) and the famous movie director, Kurata Bunjin.⁴⁴

It is not clear how many films were produced altogether in Java during the Japanese occupation. According to Hirai Masao, a former staff member of Nichi'ei Jakarta branch, most of the films were destroyed and thrown away by the Japanese themselves at the time of their surrender (August 1945),⁴⁵ and therefore only the remnants (for the titles and content, see Appendix II) were confiscated by the Allied forces. Most of the confiscated films were later sent to the Netherlands, and stored at the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie in Amsterdam.⁴⁶

42. *Djawa Baroe*, No. 13, July 1, 1943, pp. 24-25.

43. *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 170, and interview with Hirai Masao, former staff of Nichi'ei Jakarta branch (Kyoto), March 3, 1980. Another movie-producing unit in Southeast Asia was set up in Manila. Among the other six ordinary branches were those in Medan and Makassar.

44. *Nihon Eiga Hattatsushi*, p. 116. According to Hirai (interview, March 3, 1980) the official status of the Japanese members of staff was as "military civilians" under supervision of the Japanese Cabinet Information Bureau.

45. Interview with Hirai.

46. Interview October 1979 and June 1986 with Mr. Jansen, a staff member of Stichting Film en Wetenschap (Dutch Foundation for Films and Science) in Utrecht,

When a research team of R.V.O. catalogued these in 1962, there were at least 155 reels, many of which had been made in Java.⁴⁷ Those films were then dispersed, and as far as the writer could confirm, some of the reels that were once kept at the Film Museum in Amsterdam have now been transferred to the Film Archive Section of Rijks Voorlichting Dienst (R.V.D. National Information Service) in The Hague.⁴⁸

The movies made in Java, although based on the same ideological and moral concept as those made in Japan, were even more clearly "national policy movies." They were produced to fit more closely with the local situation and needs, and usually had an even more explicit propagandistic and instructive character. On the other hand they were less devoted to providing entertainment and amusement. Mr. Jansen, a staff member of Stichting Film en Wetenschap (Dutch Foundation for Films and Science), who had the opportunity of watching the 155 reels of confiscated movies, has classified them into the following four categories:⁴⁹

- (a) Those which set up Japanese supreme military power against the defeated British and American Forces. (23 items).
- (b) Those made after early 1943 which use the religious concept of *Hakkō Ichū* (Eight Corners of the World under the Same Roof) to sanction the expansionist policy of the Japanese.
- (c) Those made after end of 1943 which emphasize the role played by Indonesian society within the Great Asian Commonwealth, i.e., devolution. (66 items).
- (d) Those made after November 1944 which appeal bluntly to Indonesian nationalism and instincts of self-defense, the sort of self-glorification of Indonesia. (12 items).

In Java, as in Japan, production of documentary, culture, and news films was particularly encouraged. It started in September 1942 as soon as Jawa Eiga Kōsha opened their studio in Jatinegara, and after April 1943 was continued by Nichi'ei. According to *Jawa Nenkan*,⁵⁰ Nichi'ei in 1943 was supplying a new item of documentary or culture film every two weeks, which means 24 items annually. If they maintained this pace of production, the number of films produced by the end of the occupation must have been large. The films were usually short (10-20 minutes) and had very clear-cut propaganda themes. (For the titles and content, see Appendix II.)

The news films were first issued monthly by Djawa Eiga Kōsha under the title of *Djawa Bahroe* (New Java) until the eighth issue in March 1943. Then Nichi'ei produced a new fortnightly series called *Berita Film di Djawa/Djawa Nāysu* (Java News). This continued up to issue No. 19 of the series which

who once carried out research on those films (Utrecht).

47. According to Mr. Jansen, those 155 reels seem to cover the most important part of all confiscated Japanese films. 155 reels do not mean 155 items, for usually one item consisted of 2-4 reels. Interview with Jansen (Utrecht), October 1979 and June 1986.

48. Those were still in the process of being catalogued when the writer visited in June 1986. However, she was given the opportunity to look at a part of the collection.

49. Cited from "The Far East and World War II."

50. *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 170.

appeared in December 1943. Then, from the beginning of 1944 newsreels were made under a new name, *Nanpō Hōdō*.⁵¹ (For the main topics of the news films, see Appendix III.) These newsreels, which were edited in Java, covered not only domestic news, but also that coming from other occupied areas in Southeast Asia. The news films shot outside Java by the reporters from each local Nichi'ei branch were sent to Jakarta and edited into one newsreel volume which was distributed to all these areas.

The news films were explicitly instructive in nature, and also had the following notable characteristics. First, unlike newsreels today, they were not much concerned about reporting social incidents which involved specific individuals, such as crimes, traffic accidents, and fires; rather, much more space was allocated to reporting events involving the total society, such as activities of social-political organizations, youth training, production increases, speeches by government and military leaders, victorious battles, etc. And in reporting this "news" the reporters' main concern was always to give moral and technical teaching as well as transmit the government's messages.

Secondly the news films were not only concerned about reporting "news," but often spent time on purely technical and moral teaching as did the culture films. They gave instruction on such techniques as fishing, cotton planting, cotton weaving, Japanese customs, ceramic manufacturing, and health maintenance.

Thirdly the news films often spent considerable time on reporting the speeches of prominent Indonesian leaders. Most frequently appearing on the screen was, of course, Soekarno.

Fourthly, the Indonesian narration for the films was given in the peculiar wartime Japanese style, which sounds like a war cry.

Production of feature films, on the other hand, started much later; the first, *Kemakmoeran* (Prosperity), was screened in January 1944, and the second, *Berdjoeang* (Fighting), appeared in March of the same year.⁵² The themes of these films were dictated by Sendenbu, and, following this, the Japanese staff of Nichi'ei made a brief outline of the story, which was then submitted to Sendenbu to be censored. Only after the story passed the censors, was the full scenario written in Indonesian.⁵³ The films were spoken in Indonesian, and the actors were recruited from among Indonesian *pribumi*.

The instructions conveyed through the motion pictures were not confined to the political and spiritual sphere but also included practical and technical teaching. This was especially evident in culture and news films. For example, films such as *Pemakaran Tombak Bamboo*, *Indonesia Raya*, and *AIUEO no Uta* had the immediate and concrete purpose of teaching military skills, the national anthem, and Japanese script respectively. There were also the movies giving lessons on agricultural techniques and handicraft skills such as weaving, plowing, planting paddy, and making rope. Two movies on the *tonarigumi* were to illustrate the daily activities of the neighborhood association and to help correct understanding of its role and nature. *Taiteki Kanshi* instructed how to be alert against the enemy. Such use of films as a means of technical instruction was an entirely new departure for both Japanese and Javanese, and originated in the wartime situation. They remind us of contemporary Japanese educational TV programs,

51. Ibid., pp. 169-70.

52. Ibid., p. 170.

53. Interview with Hirai.

which are used for school as well as social education. In fact these wartime films can be considered as the forerunner of contemporary audio-visual education.

Of locally made movies on Java one of the most interesting was *Berdjoeang / Minami no Ganbō* (Fighting). It was the first feature film to be made during the Japanese occupation and to be directed by the Indonesian director, Arifin. This movie was sent to Japan and a review of it was published in *Eiga Techō* (June 24 1944). The story is as follows:⁵⁴

Berdjoeang

In a village in Sumedang, West Java, lived three young men, Saman, Anang, and Ahmad. Both Anang and Ahmad were in love with Saman's beautiful sister, Hasanah. But Hasanah loved only Anang. One day at the *Balai Desa*, the *sonchō* gave a speech to the villagers, urging them to join the *heihō* (assistant Indonesian soldiers in the Japanese Army). Saman and Anang were very much attracted by his speech and they applied for *heihō*, but only Anang was accepted. Saman was rejected because of his lameness resulting from an accident inadvertently caused by Anang when they were little. Hearing of Anang's decision to join the *heihō*, Hasanah at first felt very lonely, because they had to be separated and would not be able to get married. But after Anang persuaded her she finally understood the importance of service to the fatherland.

As for Ahmad, he refused to become a soldier and tempted Saman to lead a fast life. In his disappointment at being rejected by the *heihō*, Saman succumbed to this temptation and followed Ahmad. But later he was saved by a local entrepreneur, Gozali, and began to work at his farm. He first worked as a coolie on a cotton farm, but by and by he was promoted to a higher position because of his excellent accomplishments. Finally he was offered Gozali's daughter as his wife and accepted her. Thus he became the manager of the farm himself and contributed economically to his fatherland. He assigned priority to those crops which were desperately needed by the government, such as cotton, tea, coffee, and rice.

Meanwhile Ahmad was trying to seduce Hasanah by falsely telling her that Anang had been killed in a traffic accident, but Hasanah remained loyal to her boy friend. Then, one day, Anang came back to his village as a section chief (*hanchō*) of the *heihō* with his soldiers. While he was talking to Saman on his farm, a thief tried to break into Saman's farm and was captured. The thief turned out to be Ahmad. But Saman was kind enough to free his old friend after giving him a lecture. In the final scene a trumpet sounded to call Anang back to his duty. He departed again, seen off by his friends.

Various moral teachings are combined in this film. The main theme is "devotion to the nation." In the case of Anang this was expressed by his joining the *heihō*, while Saman demonstrated it by engaging in economic activities. The movie teaches that those who are not fit to make a physical contribution can still serve the nation by other means. The movie also, through Hasanah, describes the ideal image of woman. When her boy friend decided to join the *heihō*,

54. Iijima Tadashi, *Senchō Eigashi Shiki* [Private Memorandum on Wartime Movies] (Tokyo: M.G. Shuppan, 1984), pp. 321-22.

she accepted it, though it was a hard and sad destiny for her, and while he was away she remained loyal to him, firmly rejecting Ahmad's attempts to seduce her. Also emphasized in this movie was the close friendship between Saman and Anang, and the generosity of Gozali to Saman and that of Saman to Ahmad.

* * *

It is impressive that, despite the limited facilities, staff, and experiences, quite a few movies were produced in wartime Java. In comparison with the situation of the prewar movie industry considerable development occurred during the Japanese occupation not only in terms of the length of the films produced, but also in their quality. Some of the movies which the writer herself has seen were of reasonably high artistic quality.

As for the influence of Japanese film making on the Indonesian staff, Usmar Ismail, a scenario writer who used to work for Keimin Bunka Shidōsho, has written as follows:⁵⁵

The truly new climate, both in terms of content and process of film making, came at the time of the Japanese Occupation. At that time we first came to be aware of the function of film as a means of social communication. One more thing to be mentioned is protection of language and as its result . . . it came to be clear that films began to grow and come closer to the national consciousness.

As for progress made in the studio's working techniques, Armijn Pané has written as follows:⁵⁶

Japanese film makers worked in a systematic way, both in preparation and film making itself. It is different from the working techniques in Chinese (film) companies (in the prewar period), which were restrained by the notion of keeping production costs low, and the Indonesian staff really learned a lot (from the Japanese). . . . Since performances were preceded by rehearsals of the dialogue, the way of speaking the language became very fluent: the language used (during the Japanese occupation) was no longer *bahasa Melayu-Tionghoa* (Sino-Malay dialect) or that of the newspapers, but a more correct form. . . .

After the Japanese surrender Nichi'ei was taken over by the government of the Republic of Indonesia, and its facilities were put under the control of the Directorate of Movies and Communication of the Department of Information, headed by R. M. Sutarto. When the Republican government moved to Yogyakarta, they could take only a part of those facilities, but with them they produced several documentary films during the Revolution.⁵⁷

55. Usmar Ismail, "Sari Soal dalam Film-film Indonesia" [Basic Questions in Indonesian films], *Star News*, Vol. III, No. 5 (September 25, 1954), p. 30 cited in *Profil Dunia Film Indonesia*, p. 34.

56. Armijn Pané, "Produksi film Cerita di Indonesia" [Production of Feature Film in Indonesia], *Indonesia*, Vol. IV, No. 1-2 (January/February, 1953), p. 52, cited in *Profil Dunia Film Indonesia*, pp. 34-35.

57. "Indoneisa Eiga Shōshi," p. 210, n. 12. But it is said that there was no production of films except newsreels between August 1945 and 1947. *Profil Dunia Film Indonesia*, p. 37.

(4) Movie Distribution in Javanese Society

How, then, were the movies of the occupation period projected into the society? To what extent were they accessible to the rural population, and how were they received there? Movie distribution and screening was under management of Eihai. Its Jakarta branch (Jawa Eihai) was set up in April 1943, a year after the Japanese occupied Java, with Mitsuhashi Tessei as its president. Having close relations with Sendenbu, it formulated and carried out the general program of using movies for propaganda purposes: it engaged in selecting the movies to be distributed, allocating them to the local theaters, managing all the confiscated movie theaters, carrying out open-air movie screenings, etc.⁵⁸

The movies, carefully selected and produced, were then distributed to the movie theaters all over Java. According to *Jawa Nenkan*⁵⁹ 117 theaters operated as ordinary commercial theaters in April 1943 when Eihai was set up. Chinese capital supported 95 percent of those theaters, but after the Japanese came, all of them were put under Japanese control: the theaters were then divided into four ranks and the admission fee for each of them was regulated by Eihai as shown in Table 4:⁶⁰

Table 4
Admission Fee to Movie Theaters

rank of theater	class of seat			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
first	80 cents	50 cents	30 cents	---
second	60 "	40 "	20 "	---
third	50 "	30 "	20 "	10 cents
fourth	40 "	25 "	15 "	10 "

The difference between the most expensive ticket (80 cents) and the cheapest one (10 cents) was much smaller than in Dutch days, when the fee had ranged from 6 cents (equivalent to 13 cents under Japanese rule) to 2 guilders (equivalent to 4 yen 40 sen under Japanese rule).⁶¹ Jawa Eihai also decreed that 50 percent of all the seats in theaters of every rank should be in the cheapest class, so that many poor Indonesian *pribumi* could have easy access to the movies, while in the Dutch period the share assigned this class had been only 5-10 percent.⁶²

58. Interview with Kudô Ki'ichi, a former official of Jawa Eihai (Osaka), February 1980.

59. *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 171.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

61. *Ibid.*, p.170 The information about the admission fee in the Dutch period was also confirmed by "Ran'in no Eigakai to Nihon Eiga no Hankyô," p. 23.

62. *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 170.

The cheapest admission fee under Japanese rule, 10 sen, was equivalent to the official price for one kilogram of husked rice (*beras*) as of April 1944.⁶³

Besides those ordinary commercial theaters, there were also several specialized theaters with specified purposes, as follows:⁶⁴

- | | |
|--|--|
| (a) those directly owned by Jawa Eihai and operated for propaganda purposes only | 35 theaters (23 in West Java, 3 in Central Java, and 9 in East Java) ⁶⁵ |
| (b) those open to Japanese only | 6 theaters (Tokyo Theater in Jakarta, Ginza Theater in Bandung, Nippon Theater in Semarang, Tōa Theater in Yogyakarta, Nippon Theater in Surabaya and Kyōei Theater in Malang) |
| (c) a theater for news and short culture films only (free admission) | one theater in Semarang (Semarang Hōdō Gekijō) |
| (d) one for school children for educational purposes (free admission) | one theater in Jakarta (Ya'eshio Gekijō) |

All the measures Jawa Eihai took in managing the movie theaters indicate how eager the Japanese authorities were to encourage the masses, especially the poorer people, to watch movies. However, the problem was that locational distribution of the movie theaters was very uneven, with an extreme concentration in large cities. Table 5 shows the geographical distribution of movie theaters in the late Dutch period (1937) according to residency. Since most of the theaters continued to operate under Japanese rule, this distribution is to a large extent applicable to this later period. In terms of ratio vis-à-vis the population (which totaled about 50 million as of 1943), the number of theaters in Java was small, i.e., one theater per 400,000 persons.⁶⁶ The number of theaters per one million persons varied widely among the residencies, ranging from 0.5 in Bojonegoro to 8.2 in Surabaya. There were a relatively large number of theaters in such residencies as Surabaya, Besuki, Malang, and Jakarta, while Bojonegoro, Cirebon, Madiun, and Pekalongan had very few. It is said that the 129 theaters were all located in urban areas: according to research made by Nichiei in early 1942, 52 of them were concentrated in the following 7 large cities:⁶⁷

63. *Kan Pō*, No. 16, April 1943.

64. *Jawa Nenkan*, pp. 171-72.

65. The figure for West Java is printed in *Jawa Nenkan* as 32, but this seems to be a misprint for the correct number of 23.

66. This is clear if these figures are compared with the case of Japan, where there were 2,350 movie theaters in those days (*Nihon Eiga Hattatsushi*, p. 83), and their ratio to the population (about 76 million) was one theater for about 32,000 persons.

67. "Ran'in no Eigakai to Nihon Eiga no Hankyo," p. 23. *Nihon Eiga Hattatsushi* gives different figures as follows (p. 121): Jakarta, 20; Surabaya, 24; Semarang, 9; Bandung, 11.

Jakarta	13
Surabaya	12
Semarang	7
Bandung	7
Malang	6
Surakarta	4
Yogyakarta	3

The remaining theaters were apparently dispersed among middle and small towns all over Java, and it seems that there were none in rural areas, where the bulk of the Javanese population lived. It was because of that that the government got the idea of promoting the "traveling theater" or "mobile cinema" to fill the lack of commercial theaters.

Mobile Cinema. The idea of the mobile cinema itself was not new for either Indonesians or Japanese. In prewar Indonesia private companies had sometimes

Table 5
Number of Movie Theaters in the Late Dutch Period

residency	number of theaters	approximate population (thousand persons)	number of theaters per one million persons
Banten	2	1,253	1.6
Jakarta	19	3,297	5.8
Bogor	8	2,710	3.0
Priangan	8	4,213	1.9
Cirebon	2	2,532	0.8
Pekalongan	3	3,223	0.9
Semarang	9	2,482	3.6
Pati	7	2,292	3.1
Banyumas	3	2,520	1.2
Kedu	5	3,092	1.6
Yogyakarta	4	1,901	2.1
Surabaya	22	2,686	8.2
Bojonegoro	1	2,085	0.5
Madiun	2	2,395	0.8
Kediri	6	2,942	2.0
Malang	12	3,351	3.6
Besuki	16	2,544	6.3
Total	129	51,032	2.5

Source: The number of theaters is cited from "Nanpō Eiga Jijō," pp. 23-25. This is based on Dutch statistics, but the figures for Surakarta and Madura are missing. *Nihon Eiga Hattatsushi*, p. 121, gives 240 as the total number of movie theaters in Java. Population figures are from *Jawa Nengan*, p. 219. These are estimated figures as of 1943.

used it for advertising their products.⁶⁸ However, the attempt during the Japanese occupation to use the mobile cinema on a large scale for political indoctrination was totally new to Indonesian society. This was first begun in August 1942,⁶⁹ and with establishment of Jawa Eihai was further developed. By that time the Japanese had had enough experience in using mobile cinemas in Japan,⁷⁰ and this was applied to Java. The Eihai central office sent forty-eight movie projection experts, together with the necessary facilities, to promote traveling theaters in occupied Southeast Asia.⁷¹ Six of these experts were sent to Java.⁷² By December 1943 five operational bases for the mobile cinema had been established in Jakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, and Malang, with fifteen projecting teams,⁷³ some headed by a Japanese, and others by an Indonesian. These teams traveled from one village to another, carrying a movie projector, generator (home light), and films (16mm) in a truck. Each team consisted of a member of Jawa Eihai (usually the projecting engineer), a local Sendenbu official, an interpreter, and a truck driver, etc. According to *Jawa Nenkan* during the five months between July and November 1943 a traveling team screened the film, "Hawaii Marei Oki Kaisen [The War at Sea from Hawaii to Malaya]," at more than 220 places.⁷⁴ At several important locations Soekarno was present at the performance.⁷⁵

Tours were also often arranged for particular occasions and ceremonial events. For example at *Kō-A Sai* (Anniversary of the Breakout of the Great East Asian War) in December 1943, there were open-air movie screenings at eight places in the Special City of Jakarta before a total of 53,000 spectators, at eight places in the Jakarta residency before a total of 104,000 spectators, and at eight places in the Bogor residency before a total of 96,000 spectators.⁷⁶

Usually only one or two villages were chosen from each *don* (sub-district)

68. Ibid., pp. 23-24. For example, a Japanese Eye Medicine Company carried out an open-air movie performance in 1940 at 40 different places in Java. At that time the movies screened were not direct commercial advertisements but Japanese culture films and animation films. Prior to the projection Japanese and Javanese music was played over a gramophone to attract a large audience. It is said that each time there were at least 1,500 in the audience.

69. *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 171.

70. In Japan these attempts had been made separately by various agencies, such as newspaper companies, movie production companies, and mass organizations since the early 1930s. For details, see Hoshino Jirokichi, "Idō Eiga no Shimei [The Mission of Travelling Theaters]," *Eiga Junpō*, September 21, 1942 and *Nihon Eigashi*, p. 98.

71. *Nihon Eiga Hattatsushi*, p. 145, and interview with Kudō.

72. Interview with Kamino Eiji (Tokyo), July 21, 1986. He was one of the six experts sent to Java. They arrived in Java in mid-1943, and it was only after that that systematic performances of the mobile cinema started.

73. *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 171. Jawa Eihai further had a plan to expand the operation of traveling theaters by setting up one team in each residency and principality, but apparently the plan was not realized.

74. *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 171.

75. Interview with Kamino.

76. "Sendenbu Monthly Report," No. 22, December 1943.

or *gun* (district) as the screening sites, and the people of the neighboring villages were invited. The movies were shown in the open air at an empty ground (*Lapangan*) near the *Balai Desa* (village office), and were open to anyone free of charge. Inhabitants of all the neighboring villages had previously been notified through village officials and *tonarigumi* heads.

Unlike other mass meetings the authorities had little trouble in attracting people in the rural areas to the movie shows.⁷⁷ Most of the writer's informants stated that they had seen movies at least once during the Japanese occupation, and this had been usually their first experience of watching movies.

The movie tours were sometimes aimed at a particular audience such as *romusha*, factory laborers, and school children. For example, it was reported that between December 16 and 30, 1943, mobile cinemas performed at thirteen places in Banten residency to entertain a total of 126,000 *romusha*, who were engaged in airfield construction, mining, and other essential work.⁷⁸ Films were also shown in the same month for 3,000 *romusha* waiting in Jakarta for shipping to Sumatra and Borneo.⁷⁹

III. OTHER AUDITORY-VISUAL PROPAGANDA MEDIA

Though not as conspicuous as movies, other auditory-visual media were also positively used as a tool for indoctrination.

(1) *Drama*

When the Japanese came to Indonesia, modern Indonesian theatrical drama had a history of only fifteen years or so.⁸⁰ Japanese propaganda authorities, however, soon developed it into a propaganda tool. To make it effective, a play had to be of high quality both as art and as entertainment. Being aware of the reality that the Indonesian play was still underdeveloped, the Japanese first tried to raise its quality and change its image. Most intellectuals paid little attention to "*sandiwara*" or "*tonil*"⁸¹ which they considered less valuable and sophisticated than other art forms such as novels and poems. Indonesian drama was regarded as a low standard amusement for the uneducated masses.⁸² Thus, in order to raise the standard of "*sandiwara*" among the performing arts, Sendenbu set up a drama school (*Sekolah Tonil*) in Jakarta to train professional

77. Interview with Kamino.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. For information on the history of theatrical plays in the Dutch period, see "*Sandiwara Indonesia*" in *Pandji Poestaka*, No. 37, December 19, 1942, pp. 1330-36.

81. *Sandiwara* is Indonesian: *sandi* means "hidden" and *wara* means "notion" and "idea." *Tonil* came from the Dutch word, *toneel*, meaning drama.

82. "*Sandiwara*," *Djawa Baroe*, No. 3, February 1, 1944, p. 32. Apparently it took a long time to get rid of such prejudice among the intellectuals, and even as late as 1944 the appeal was often made for raising the quality of "*sandiwara*" to make them acceptable to intellectuals.

scenario writers, actors, and other staff.⁸³ Sendenbu then encouraged formation of new theatrical groups which would play a leading role in performing "new" dramas recommended by the government. These new groups included "*Dewi Mada*," "*Bintang Soerabaja*," "*Tjahaja Timoer*," "*Wanasari*," and "*Miss Tjitjih*".⁸⁴

After the Keimin Bunka Shidōsho or Poesat Keboedajaan was established in April 1943 theatrical plays were put under the direct control and guidance of its Performing Arts Section headed by an Indonesian, Winarno.⁸⁵ This section worked as a headquarters for formulating basic policies on the use of drama for political propaganda, and it was in charge of encouraging, training, and controlling all kinds of theatrical activity.

It was Keimin Bunka Shidōsho that decided what kind of stories should be performed and what theme should be emphasized in them. At an early stage of the Japanese occupation, the dramas of the Dutch period were still staged, but these were gradually replaced by new repertoires. In order to encourage creation of good scenarios Keimin Bunka Shidōsho carried out contests, and the scenarios which won the prizes were collected and published in a book titled *Keboedajaan Timoer*.⁸⁶ Keimin Bunka Shidōsho itself also engaged in preparing scenarios by mobilizing first-class writers, both Indonesian and Japanese. Among them was Armijn Pané, one of the well-known Indonesian writers belonging to *Poedjanga Baroe* who had worked for *Balai Poestaka* in the 1930s.⁸⁷ Such efforts to mobilize novelists for scenario writing were aimed at combining pure literature with popular entertainment thus raising the quality of the latter.

The new scenarios accepted by Keimin Bunka Shidōsho were, then, distributed to the theatrical groups. Usually the above-mentioned national groups first performed the new repertoires, traveling from one city to another introducing them to the local theatrical groups. Some of the new scenarios were also published in the popular magazine, *Djawa Baroe*, so that many smaller theatrical groups, beyond the direct control of Keimin Bunka Shidōsho, were also able to perform them. (For the titles and summaries of the stories of the new repertoires during the Japanese occupation, see Appendix IV.)

Like the movies, most of these plays dealt with topics of primary concern to the government such as *gotong royong* (mutual help), *tonarigumi* (neighborhood association), defense of fatherland, volunteer army, *romusha* (forced coolie laborer), and the brutality of the Dutch. In the later period of the Japanese occupation historical stories were also encouraged. In *Djawa Baroe*, No. 12 of June 15, 1945, an article, entitled "Kewadjiban Sandiwara dalam Oesaha Indonesia Merdeka [The Duty of Dramas in the Efforts for Indonesian Independence],"

83. *Pandji Poestaka*, No. 16, July 25, 1942, p. 551.

84. For details, see *Djawa Baroe*, No. 5, March 1, 1943. Among them the most popular was *Bintang Soerabaja* sponsored by a Chinese from East Java, Fred Young (The Teng Choen). "Indonesia Eigashi," p. 182. This group was later in 1948 reorganized as a film-making company. *Profil Dunia Film*, p. 37. Besides those nationally known nuclear groups many other minor local groups were set up, and all those groups later formed Jawa Engeki Kyōkai or Perserikatan Oesaha Sandiwara Djawa (P.O.S.D. Java Theatrical Play Association).

85. *Jawa Nengan*, pp. 168-69.

86. Brugmans et al., *Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bazzetting* (Franeker: Uitgave T. Wever, 1960), p. 205.

87. *Terkemoeka*, p. 422.

stressed the importance of historical plays, which were effective in stirring up anti-Dutch feeling and strengthening national consciousness for defense of the fatherland.

Besides historical plays, a form of short comedy called *lelucon* was also encouraged. In *lelucon* the main character was almost always a stupid but good-hearted villager, who reminds us of a *pelawak* (clown) in *wayang orang*. The *lelucon*, usually a short one-act play, takes the form of a dialogue between a stupid man and a wise man who provides correct information and explanations on the new policies and directives of the government. The style of the comedy seems to have been influenced by Japanese comic stage dialogue/cross-talk called *manzai*, which Japanese propaganda authorities also tried to introduce into Java as a propaganda tool.⁸⁸ *Lelucon* was more often performed in the later days of the occupation, especially during the last few months. Among the repertoires in Appendix IV those classified as *lelucon* were, *Kumichō Istimewa*, *Gerakan Hidoep Baroe* and *Hidoep dan Mati*.

(2) Wayang and Dance

The Japanese also tried to use Javanese traditional performing arts for propaganda purposes. According to *Asia Raya* of January 22, 1945, a special performance of *wayang golek* (puppet show) was put on by Jakarta citizens in cooperation with Keimin Bunka Shidōsho and Sendenbu. It was an entirely new performance, lasting three hours instead of the usual all-night show. In accordance with the government's intention, the story was aimed at inspiring a fighting spirit among the people.⁸⁹

The Japanese also made use of *wayang kulit* (shadow plays). According to a prominent *dalang* (shadow-play operator and narrator) in Surakarta, Said,⁹⁰ he promoted the so-called *wayang sandiwara* (literally means "dramatic shadow play") with encouragement from the local government. *Wayang sandiwara* was his own creation, which he had developed in the late Dutch period. As with *wayang kulit*, it used puppets made of carved buffalo leather behind a screen, but the *wayang sandiwara* puppet had the face of an ordinary human being. The stories were based on contemporary topics. Under the Japanese he promoted this *wayang sandiwara* for propaganda purposes, himself writing four stories and carving the leather puppets for them. In the performances he staged in neighboring villages the *dalang* spoke in Javanese, using, as in ordinary *wayang kulit*, a lot of *ad lib* dialogue. While regular *wayang* performances last the whole night, this new variation was performed in three hours between 9 and 12 p.m. This kind of *wayang sandiwara* continued to be popular even after Japanese surrender and was used for propaganda to stimulate and encourage the independence struggle against the Dutch. After 1950 *wayang sandiwara* was given a new name, *wayang suluh* (information wayang) and was used by the Department of Information under the Soekarno regime.

88. Interview with Besut Hadiwardoyo, and with Watanabe Junzō, former official of Yogyakarta Kōchi Jimukyoku (Jakarta), August 22, 1980.

89. This article in *Asia Raya* has been cited in *Nederlandsch Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, pp. 207-8. The newspaper further mentioned that the same kind of *wayang golek* performance would be made in various villages in West Java following the example of Jakarta.

90. Interview with Said (Surakarta), May 15, 1981.

According to another *dalang* in Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta, Cermokarsono,⁹¹ regular *wayang kulit* was also used for government propaganda. The stories chosen were mainly those dealing with war and military heroes, and the Japanese ordered that those historical wars be identified with the contemporary war against the Allied Forces. The *dalang* was also expected to utter a lot of *ad lib* remarks, expressing government policies and wishes.

Dance was also used for propaganda. *Djawa Baroe* of December 1, 1943 (p. 31) included a report about a new repertory of traditional Sundanese ballet entitled *Tari Meroentoehkan Amerika / Inggeris* (Dance of Destroying America-Britain). The story was about a fight between a princess of the sun (Japan) and princesses of evil countries (America-Britain). The idea for this ballet was proposed by the *kenchō* (regent) of Ciamis, Sorya.

(3) *Kamishibai*

The Japanese also introduced a picture-story-show called *kamishibai* (literally means "paper theater"),⁹² which is popular among Japanese children. In Japan it is often used at school for educational purposes but it is also performed as profit-making entertainment, when a professional operator goes round from one street to another, riding a bicycle and carrying sets of pictures drawn on hard square sheets of paper. Stopping at several places by the roadside, he calls in the neighborhood children and puts on a show for a small fee. He presents a series of pictures to the spectators, narrating the story just like a *dalang* in wayang performances. In Java this picture show was considered one of the easiest and cheapest media for transmitting the government's message, and the Japanese used it for adults as well as children.

The Sendenbu directly supervised both production and performance of *kamishibai*. But sometimes other government agencies took a part in promoting certain repertories with particular propaganda themes. For example, the Chokinkyoku (Postal Savings Bureau) often took the initiative in making *kamishibai* which advocated increased postal saving. Items with more general moral teachings were made in Japan and distributed to Java, but most of the others were locally made in Java by Sendenbu staff. A set of *kamishibai* pictures was first prepared at the central office of Sendenbu. These were painted by hand one by one on large carton papers, about one meter square or slightly smaller. A few copies were duplicated and distributed to the Sendenbu's local branches. Then many more copies were duplicated there and further distributed to lower-level agencies.⁹³

91. Interview with Cermokarsono (Wonosari, Gunung Kidul), October 22, 1980.

92. In Java the *kamishibai* was often translated as *wayang beber*, which originally means a traditional Javanese picture-story drawn on rolled paper. *Wayang beber* is actually quite different from Japanese *kamishibai*, because it is to be read personally and not meant for public performance. The Japanese authorities identified *kamishibai* with traditional *wayang beber* in order to give the population in Java a feeling of familiarity with the "paper theater."

93. The *kamishibai* pictures which the writer has seen at Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, (R.V.O., The State Institute of War Documentation) in Amsterdam were all hand painted in water-colors. *Djawa Baroe* (No. 22 November 19, 1944) introduced the process of *kamishibai* production under the title of "Dapoer Kamishibai (The Kitchen of *Kamishibai*)" by illustrative photos, including

A *kamishibai* tour was usually made within one day by a single operator riding a bicycle, but for special campaigns a big team consisting of film projectionists, musicians, *manzai*-talkers, and actors usually toured for several days in a truck. When performing a *kamishibai* show, the operator usually had quite a free hand in arranging the narration to suit the local situation, although the story outline had already been constructed at the central office in Jakarta. Local language was used whenever it was considered more effective. A story was usually made up of 10-40 scenes and a performance lasted about 10-20 minutes. Public performance of *kamishibai* on the street and squares were open to everybody free of charge. Through village officials and *tonarigumi* leaders, the *kamishibai* show had been previously announced to the whole population, and therefore it usually attracted quite a few spectators in rural areas. Most villagers whom the writer interviewed, had seen or at least heard of the *kamishibai* show during the occupation.

Most of the themes of the *kamishibai* had a direct, strong flavor of government propaganda. Thirteen excerpts from *kamishibai* stories together with their pictures appeared in *Djawa Baroe* between March and October 1944, and their titles and themes are listed in Appendix V. A few of the topics had no political flavor and were purely entertainment, but the majority were directly connected to government propaganda. According to the "Sendenbu Monthly Report," *kamishibai* themes which were particularly emphasized in December 1943 included:

- (a) Promotion of increased agricultural production;
- (b) Promotion of postal saving;
- (c) National defense (call for joining the Peta Army);
- (d) Encouragement and guidance for *tonarigumi*;
- (e) Encouragement to join *romusha* (coolie laborer);
- (f) History of Java;
- (g) Introducing Japanese children.

A former *kamishibai* operator in Yogyakarta, Besut Hadiwardoyo, mentioned that the most frequently used themes were (a) military, and (b) moral improvement. Two of the most popular *kamishibai* repertoires in Yogyakarta were *Tri Margojoya* and *Wirawiyoto*. The former was a story emphasizing three conditions for victory, namely (a) solidarity between the military and the people, (b) enough foodstuffs, and (c) resistance against America and Britain. The latter was a historical story on Mangkunegara IV and it emphasized similarity between Japanese *bushido* (the *samurai* spirit) and Javanese *ksatria* spirit.⁹⁴

(4) Song

Songs were also used to transmit Japanese ideas to the population and to raise the people's morale. All through the occupation period Japanese military and patriotic songs were taught at schools, training courses, meetings of *seinendan*, *fujinkai*, and other mass organizations. There were two kinds of song promoted during the occupation: one consisted of Japanese songs imported to Java, and the other of locally made propaganda songs. Several booklets of

ones of Sendenbu staff drawing pictures by hand. In the Material Section of Sendenbu quite a few prominent Japanese painters and caricaturists directed the production of *kamishibai*.

94. Interview with Besut Hadiwardoyo.

Japanese songs were published for the occupied areas.⁹⁵ (See Appendix VI-A.) Although originally composed in Japanese by Japanese musicians, the contents of some of the songs were aimed at inspiring the morale and spirit of Asian people, and were apparently composed specifically for the populations in occupied Southeast Asia.

Not all the Japanese songs were translated, but many were directly taught and sung in the original Japanese. Apparently the Javanese people were just told to memorize them without really understanding the meaning. Nevertheless, the melodies were usually much loved by the Indonesians, and it seems possible that there might be some affinity in taste for rhythm and melody between Indonesians and Japanese. Contemporary Japanese visitors to Indonesia are surprised to find that Indonesian old people can still remember and sing those songs, which a younger generation of Japanese no longer know. One of them, *Aikoku no Hana* [Flower of Patriotism], has very melancholy music in a minor tone, and was a theme song for a movie with the same title. (See No. 29 in Appendix I.) Soekarno liked the song and later under his regime it was translated into Indonesian and taught in schools.

Besides these Japanese songs, new propaganda songs were also composed in Java. As early as April 1942, a month after the Japanese invasion, an Indonesian song "*Hidoep Indonesia*" was composed by Japanese specialists in Sendenbu.⁹⁶ After establishment of Keimin Bunka Shidōsho in April 1943, its Music Section, headed by Utoyo, encouraged Indonesian poets and musicians to compose propaganda songs. Some of those new songs were printed in *Djawa Baroe* starting in October 1943, and it appears that from this time there was positive encouragement of new songs. Appendix VI-B gives examples of locally made propaganda songs published in *Djawa Baroe*. Most of them were composed by the staff of Keimin Bunka Shidōsho: the staff of its Music Section⁹⁷ composed the music and the staff of its Literature Section the words. Looking at the words of the songs it is clear that the propaganda themes they contain can be roughly classified into the following four categories:

1. those to inspire a working spirit;
2. those to inspire a fighting spirit;
3. those to inspire patriotic consciousness as a member of Greater East Asia;
4. others.

All the songs had vivid and vigorous rhythms like a military march, and they were often sung when seinendan members and school children were marching and carrying out *kerja bakti* (volunteer work for nation). Quite a few informants mentioned that they were very much moved and their working spirit was exalted when they sang the songs. It seems that the main effect of singing songs was more to heighten the morale of people living in a hard social-economic situation than to instruct them through any particular political message. And maybe it was exactly what the Japanese had intended.

Songs were not only used independently but also in combination with movies

95. See *Njanjian Nippon boeat Oemoem* [Japanese Songs for Public] (Yogyakarta, 1942); *Djawa Baroe*, No. 13, July 1, 1943, p. 29; *Djawa Gunseikanbu*, *Seinen no Uta* (Jakarta: Balai Poestaka, 1943).

96. *Pandji Poestaka*, No. 1, April 11, 1942, p. 17. The words of the song were by Ichiki Tatsuo, while the music was by a famous Japanese musician Iida Nobuo.

97. On the Music Section, see *Jawa Nengan*, p. 168.

and plays which had military and patriotic theme songs. With cultural films, the role of the songs was somewhat like that of commercial songs on contemporary T.V. and radio, and the producer's intention was to make the audience memorize the government messages in the forms of rhythmical songs.

(5) Radio

Brief mention should finally be made of the role of radio broadcasting in Japanese propaganda. In Japan, aware of its political importance, the government had long exerted firm control over radio broadcasting. No kind of private station was allowed and only N.H.K. (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) operated as a "privately owned government-sponsored monopoly" broadcasting station.⁹⁸ As soon as the Japanese occupied Java, the existing broadcasting station there was put under the control of Sendenbu until the Jawa Hōsō Kanrikyoku (Java Broadcasting Superintendent Bureau) was set up on October 1, 1942. Management of this bureau was entrusted to N.H.K. and it was manned by N.H.K. staff members sent from Japan, and by Indonesians formerly working for NIROM (Nederlandsch-Indische Radio Omroep Maatschapij). The Jawa Hōsō Kanrikyoku had eight local broadcasting stations, respectively in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Banyumas, Semarang, Surabaya, and Malang.⁹⁹ Although the Hōsō Kanrikyoku had a totally free hand with respect to technical and administrative affairs, program planning was controlled by Sendenbu.¹⁰⁰ The standard radio program of the Jakarta Broadcasting Station as of April 1944 was as follows.¹⁰¹

Radio Program (Jakarta Broadcasting Station)

7:30	Japanese
7:40	introduction of today's program
8:00	notice from the government
8:30	news in Javanese
8:45	physical exercise (<i>taisō</i>) by radio
9:00	news in Sundanese
9:15	Western music
9:45	intermission
11:00	lecture for women, or music
11:30	<i>keroncong</i> or <i>gamelan</i> ensemble
13:00	physical exercise (<i>taisō</i>) by radio
13:30	orchestra
14:00	news in Indonesian
14:15	music
15:30	intermission

98. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, *Public Information in Japan* (R and A Report No. 2362), Washington, D.C., August 20, 1945, p. 31.

99. Satō Katsuzō, "Jawa Hōsō Kanrikyoku no Ayumi" [History of Java Broadcasting Superintendent Bureau], *N.H.K. Bunken Geppō*, February 1975 (Tokyo: N.H.K. Sōgō Hōsō Bunka Kenkyūsho, 1975), pp. 39-48.

100. *Jawa Nenkan*, pp. 171-72.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 175. This was broadcasting for the Indonesian population. Besides this there was a second channel oriented to the Japanese population, whose broadcasting started at 18:00 and ended at 22:30 every night.

17:45 teaching Japanese
 18:00 program for children ("Easy Japanese")
 18:05 program for children (teaching Japanese songs)
 18:30 news in Indonesian
 18:45 news in Javanese
 19:00 news in Sundanese
 19:15 music
 19:30 notice from the Jakarta Special City Office
 19:40 music
 19:55 teaching songs (Mon., Wed., Fri., Sat.) or *keroncong* (Tues., Thurs., Sun.)
 20:10 teaching Japanese (Mon., Wed., Fri.) or music (Tues., Thurs., Sat., Sun.)
 20:30 orchestra
 21:00 news commentary
 21:30 news in Indonesian
 21:45 entertainment
 22:00 news in Javanese
 22:30 news in Sundanese
 23:00 music
 24:00 entertainment
 24:25 notice from the Jakarta Special City Office
 24:30 end

The same basic pattern was repeated every day following this time table set by the Sendenbu. Broadcasting started at 7:30 and lasted until 24:30 with an intermission in the morning and in the afternoon, amounting to a total of 13.5 hours of broadcasting. With some exceptions, Indonesian was the basic language used in the broadcasting. The programming was characterized by a relatively high percentage of newscasts: about 3.5 hours or one-fourth of the total broadcasting hours. The news was broadcast in four different languages: Japanese (once a day for 30 minutes); Indonesian (3 times for 45 minutes in total); Javanese (3 times for 60 minutes in total); and Sundanese (3 times for 60 minutes in total). The Japanese-language news was not for Japanese citizens, but for Indonesians studying the language. Inclusion of both Javanese and Sundanese was perhaps a unique arrangement for Jakarta, where various different ethnic groups were living. Probably in Bandung there was only a Sundanese version, and in Central and East Java only a Javanese version. Such linguistic arrangements imply that the Japanese propaganda authority was concerned with giving access to the news to large audiences so that there was as wide an understanding of government intentions as possible. Besides ordinary newscasts there were special times for notices from central and local government to be transmitted.

Another notable feature is that radio offered "educational" programs: there were lecture hours twice every day, most dealing with topics of government concern, such as technical instructions on agriculture and industry, encouragement of ideal virtues, ideological teachings, introducing Japanese society, and teaching on Islam, etc. There were also Japanese language lessons: three times a week for twenty minutes each for adults, and five minutes every day for children.

Entertainment was confined to music and traditional performing arts, and there were very few such programs as radio drama, story telling, and variety shows. "Music" included Javanese (*gamelan* and *keroncong*), Japanese (mostly military and patriotic songs), and Western (those mostly composed by Japanese and Axis composers). Some of the music was played live, but most was recorded.

Judging from this program list, radio played a varied role in government propaganda. First, it functioned as the quickest and most accurate media for publicizing the full text of government notices. Second, like other propaganda tools, it served to provide various types of direct and indirect political teachings. Among them were speeches by well-known nationalist leaders such as Soekarno. In Dutch days Indonesian leaders never had an opportunity to appeal directly to the population, and the impact on the listeners must have been quite strong. This use of broadcasting for direct appeals by top politicians was the influence of Nazi Germany.¹⁰² Thirdly, it provided people with chances for social education through its lessons on language, songs, and lectures on various topics. Fourthly, though not seen in the above-mentioned program, it served to give air-raid warnings to the population in areas where Allied bombing was frequent.

The effect of radio propaganda was apparently widespread. Compared with movies and plays its effect might have been less striking, because it appealed only to the auditory sense, but it had the merit of reaching a larger audience collectively at one time with relatively low cost and labor. Government authorities therefore sought ways to enlarge the potential audience so as to increase the impact. In 1939 the number of radio license holders in the Netherlands East Indies was 87,510, only 25,608 of whom were Indonesians. This means that the dissemination rate of radios among Indonesians was less than 0.04 percent.¹⁰³ Sendenbu authorities in Java tried to increase this rate, but there were almost no new radios except for those previously owned by the Dutch and captured by the Japanese military government.¹⁰⁴ Even taking the Dutch-owned radios into account, the dissemination rate was only 0.15 percent.

Therefore the government erected loudspeakers, called *radio tō* (radio tower) in various public places such as markets, railway stations, big streets, parks, and squares. This had already been done in Japan with successful results.¹⁰⁵ According to *Jawa Nenkan*, about 1,500 loudspeakers had been erected in Java by February 1944.¹⁰⁶ It is difficult to evaluate to what extent people actually had access to those public radios and how often they listened to them, for the limited supply of electricity meant that they were probably confined to urban or semi-urban areas. But at least in those areas considerable attention was paid to them. People called them "*pohon menyanyi*" (singing tree or singing

102. Yamada Fumio, ed., *Nihon Masu Komunikeishon-shi* [The History of Mass Communication in Japan] (Tokyo: Tōkai Univ. Press, 1970), p. 207.

103. The dissemination rate was calculated by the writer on the basis of the Indonesian population in 1930, which was 59,138,000, and it is considered to have increased considerably by the end of the 1930s. Therefore the actual dissemination rate of radio must have been lower than 0.04 percent. In Japan the license holders were 4,862,137 in 1939, but increased rapidly under positive government efforts, by 1944 amounting to 7,437,688, of which dissemination rate was 50.4 percent. Gordon Daniels, "Japanese Domestic Radio and Cinema Propaganda, 1937-1945: an Overview," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, Vol. 2, 1982, p. 117.

104. Because there was a serious shortage of radios in Japan, it was impossible to import them from there.

105. "Japanese Domestic Radio and Cinema Propaganda, 1937-1945."

106. *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 174.

tower), because most were erected at high places such as on the top of trees, poles, and roofs, and music constituted a large part of the broadcasts.¹⁰⁷

IV. JAPANESE PERCEPTION OF PROPAGANDA

How, then, did the Japanese perceive their propaganda and what kind of vision and blueprint did they have for using the new media? In determining the most effective propaganda means the cultural and language background of the society was very important. The Japanese propagandists were aware that in Java literacy was still very low, and for this reason, as we have noted, they emphasized "auditory and visual" media such as movies, performing arts, *kamishibai*, music, and posters.

The "language" to be used as the medium for propaganda was another important consideration. Japanese were confronted with the heterogeneity and complexity of language in Javanese society. They banned Dutch as an "enemy" language, and despite their desire to employ Japanese as a lingua franca for the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, the military authorities were aware that the Japanese language was still far from being a practical medium for communication. It was therefore inevitable that they should make use of *bahasa Indonesia*. Indonesian became the standard language of all propaganda materials created in Java. Local films were made with Indonesian speech and narration, and so were the plays and radio broadcasts. And in the case of Japanese films Indonesian subtitles were added.

The Japanese soon found, however, that the people on Java did not necessarily have a good command of the Indonesian language. Although since the early twentieth century the Dutch colonial government had used Indonesian as the second official language after Dutch and it had been employed in the lower levels of the administration, its use in daily life was very limited. In cities and in the coastal areas it was widely employed for inter-ethnic communication, but most rural people in the interior had a very limited command of the language. Javanese and Sundanese were their daily media of communication.

Therefore in carrying out their propaganda activities, the Japanese had to have their messages re-translated from Indonesian into local languages. During propaganda tours in the rural areas, local members of the propaganda agency had to translate the speeches from Indonesian and summarize the content of the movies and plays in Javanese or Sundanese.¹⁰⁸ Since very few Japanese had command of these local languages, they were, thus, gradually deprived of supervision and control over the content of their propaganda.

Japanese propaganda authorities seem to have been aware of this complex language situation and became even more convinced of the necessity of stressing visual appeals in their propaganda activities. They strengthened their dependence on movies, theatrical plays, and *kamishibai*, which could be understood with minimum use of language. And more straightforward and simple expressions were used in creating these propaganda materials.

The "entertainment" or "art" content of these materials was of only secondary importance. Yet Japanese propaganda leaders did not totally neglect this

107. *Nederlandsch Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 204.

108. Interview with Kamino. This was done not only by the mobile cinema, but at the ordinary commercial theaters too.

aspect, knowing that crude propaganda would bring a negative reaction and that the higher the artistic quality, the larger would be the propaganda effect. The Japanese concern was, therefore, how to increase the propaganda effect without impairing its entertainment or art aspects. Bringing first-class scenario writers, movie directors, musicians, and artists onto the Sendenbu staff indicates that the Japanese were anxious to maintain a high artistic quality in their propaganda. There were repeated discussions by experts to find out how to harmonize a propaganda purpose with artistic quality.¹⁰⁹ The quality and form of propaganda activity ranged from high culture with less propaganda flavor to a simple transmission of government information. Generally speaking the propaganda materials produced in Java tended to be more tightly and directly geared to the propaganda purpose and less oriented to entertainment than those imported from Japan. Yet, some of the movies and posters made in Java were fairly sophisticated in spite of their strong propaganda flavor. Especially impressive to the writer was the effective use of music in the movies and the refined color-combination in posters.

What were the main themes of Japanese propaganda? It seems that there was both a long-term indoctrination plan and a short-term immediate propaganda target. During the three and half years of Japanese occupation propaganda activities oscillated between those two poles. Perhaps the ultimate goal of Japanese propaganda was to mobilize the whole of Indonesian society for Japan's war effort. To achieve that purpose they may have believed it necessary to transform the mentality of Indonesian people into that of Japanese and to assimilate Indonesian society with that of Japan as had been attempted in Taiwan and Korea. In a long perspective, then, there had to be mental indoctrination encouraging particular virtues and morals, such as piety, modesty, motherly love, and diligence. Thus the government tried to present an image of the ideal man and woman in wartime displaying these virtues. Also the ideological teaching on the aim of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere had to permeate the society and be accepted by it.

In actual propaganda activities, however, more emphasis was put on practical themes with a concrete goal, partly perhaps because Indonesians showed aversion to "Japanization" and to being merged into what was called Greater East Asian culture. Indonesians did not easily accept Japanese advocacy of a "common race and common ancestor" and of cultural affinity between Japan and Indonesia. As the war situation became critical for the Japanese and as there was urgent need to acquire more positive cooperation from Indonesians, the Japanese had to make certain concessions so as not to evoke unnecessary aversion among Indonesians. The Japanese authorities, realizing this, gradually switched their policy, and the propaganda target had to be adjusted to more immediate social-economic needs. It is maybe because of this that, compared with Japan, the propaganda in Java was more material-oriented, and ideological indoctrination and moral instruction were only of secondary importance.

Such a disparity is seen in the changes made in the annual propaganda theme. According to Adachi, the former Sendenbu director, the main propaganda themes adopted for each fiscal year were as follows:¹¹⁰

109. For example, see an article titled "Kemadjoean Dalam Doenia Seni Sandiwara" [Development in the World of Theatrical Play as Art], in *Djawa Baroe*, No. 14, July 15, 1945.

110. "Replies of questionnaire concerning Sendenbu." [English as in the original.]

- "1942: The purpose of the Greater East Asian War
The Idea of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere
'Asia is One'
3-A Movement
- "1943: The Idea of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere
Promotion of increased food production
Paddy delivery
Recruitment of *romusha* [from the latter half of the year]
Gathering all power of inhabitants and friendship among them
Strengthening war power
Defense of Java
- "1944: Permeation of Military Administration
Reliance of inhabitants upon Japan
Great East Asia Conference
Promotion of increased food production
Sparing and saving
Recruitment of *romusha*
Entertainment for Japanese and inhabitants [from the latter half of the year]
- "1945: Defense of Fatherland
Prevention from spies; 'Awas, Mata2 Moesoeh' [Be careful of Enemy Spies]
Entertainment for Japanese and local inhabitants
Promotion of the fighting spirit of the Japanese"

Such propaganda themes clearly reflected the basic principles and urgent needs of the military government at each specific time.

During the first year the themes were more ideologically oriented: the government's concern was with informing people of Japanese intentions in waging war and occupying Indonesia, together with emphasizing the evil of the West. The target of the propaganda activity at that stage was to induce the local population to discard anti-Japanese feelings and persuade them into joining in the construction of a new order. Such ideological instruction was, of course, the basis of Japanese propaganda, and it continued, with some variations, to be advocated throughout the occupation period.

After the second year, however, more practical and materialistic themes were added to this ideological one, as economic exploitation came to be the most urgent need of the military government, as the war situation became more and more adverse to the Japanese, and as the probability of an Allied counterattack on Java became reality. In 1944 "sparing and saving" was added, and in 1945 "prevention from spies," showed the deterioration of the situation. Most of the individual topics can be divided into two major categories: "defense" and "economy." In other words Japanese propaganda was mainly directed at arousing the fighting and working spirit of the Javanese people, which were indispensable for continuing the war. However, in promoting those propaganda aims, the Japanese were careful not to relate them to benefits for Japan, emphasizing rather that they were all for the safety and prosperity of Indonesia. This tendency was further strengthened after the promise of Indonesian Independence in September 1944.

Another notable change was the growing emphasis on "entertainment" after the latter half of 1944. This indicates the widespread psychological strain under which both Japanese and Indonesians were suffering at that time, and the need to alleviate this. Shortage of foodstuffs, clothing materials, and almost

all other important commodities, incessant appeals for devotion to nation and sacrifice of individual happiness and pleasure, strong pressure to cooperate with the government, fear of *kenpeitai* brutality, possible suspicion of espionage--all those difficulties compelled people to live in a high state of tension. Japanese government authorities recognized that life was becoming too austere to provide meaningful incentives for the people to work, and that such austerity might lead them into anti-Japanese and anti-war sentiments. To mitigate the social tension the Sendenbu authorities considered it important to provide more entertainment. There was also an idea among Japanese propaganda leaders that entertainment could be a good incentive to increase production and strengthen national defense.¹¹¹ In line with this, more entertainment with fewer crude propaganda elements began to be encouraged. This does not necessarily mean the total elimination of propaganda, but simply that the emphasis was now on raising morale through entertainment. This same change in policy was introduced in Japan at about the same stage of the war.¹¹²

V. EFFECT OF JAPANESE PROPAGANDA

What was the people's reaction to these propaganda activities and to what extent were they effective for the Japanese in attaining their goals? First of all, it is a question as to how far the Indonesian population understood the theme and content of the propaganda. In spite of all the authorities' efforts to cope with the language problems, it is still doubtful whether the audiences really grasped the ideas and intentions of the propaganda directors, and even if they did understand the story whether they accepted the Japanese value concepts presented there. Though the moral teaching emphasized through these media was more or less universal, the way these moral concepts were expressed was peculiarly Japanese, because in those days any Japanese value concept was closely linked with the basic ideology of self-sacrifice for the sake of the Emperor (=nation). Did the Indonesians then accept those propaganda activities solely as entertainment? With reference to Japanese broadcasting, for example, a Javanese informant noted:¹¹³

When the Japanese broadcast music in Java, many people would listen, but when propaganda commenced, some walked away, saying: "Nihon-Bohong": (Nippon-Lies).

In considering the effects of Japanese propaganda, a distinction should be made between the reaction of urban intellectuals and that of the uneducated masses. For the former, who were generally more exposed to other kinds of amusement, propaganda-laden movies and theatrical performances were not as exciting as they were for the mass of the population, who were living in a

111. *Nippon Nyūsu Eiga-shi*, p. 433. In *Nippon Nyūsu*, No. 222 (August 31, 1944), a newsreel shown in Japan, an item on the mobile cinema in Java was included, and the commentator stated there that "laughter would stimulate greater production."

112. In 1944 the government directed N.H.K. to put more emphasis on entertainment in radio programs. *Nihon Masu Komunikeshon-shi*, p. 208.

113. "NEFIS Interrogation Report" (Series of interrogations of Indonesian *heicho*, *rōmusha*, and others who were captured outside Java prior to August 1945). Brisbane, 1943-1945, H-archief at Navy Archives in The Hague, No. 248, August 1944.

monotonous environment and thirsty for stimulation. In terms of artistic quality and entertainment value, the performances might have not met urban standards, but might have been sophisticated enough for rural audiences. With regard to the effect of the propaganda messages, educated people were generally better-informed on world affairs and had a wider range of knowledge, which would give them the basis for a more rational and accurate judgement of the propaganda message. The uneducated people, on the other hand, who were less exposed to information, tended to accept the propaganda at its face value.

Thus, as a whole, Japanese-style propaganda seems to have been more effective among the uneducated mass of the population, especially those living in rural areas isolated from other information sources. In the villages the performances staged by traveling propaganda teams seem to have attracted large numbers of spectators. Of course, a large audience does not necessarily mean favorable acceptance of the propaganda message. The spectators were usually attracted by the entertainment with only a slight awareness that they were going to be "indoctrinated."

In its impact Japanese indoctrination may have been strongest among the younger generation, both urban and rural. A Dutch intelligence report, in spite of its basically negative evaluation of the effect of Japanese propaganda, has given a rather different insight with regard to young people. It reported as follows:¹¹⁴

. . . There will also be a certain number of people, especially amongst the youths, who will have taken in the Japanese propaganda, and therefore co-operate fully with the Japanese, either because they believe in the Japanese promise for Independence, or because they admire Japan and its Greater East Asian principles or because they hope for material benefit.

It is true to some extent that the Japanese propaganda authorities regarded the younger generation as the most important target of their indoctrination. And in applying propaganda techniques consideration was given to appealing to this group. Also, the younger generation had more opportunity to be exposed to Japanese propaganda, because the plays, movies, and *kamishibai* were often performed at schools and local meetings of Seinendan, Barisan Pelopor, and Keibôdan, most of whose members were youths.

However, for the Javanese people in general, Japanese propaganda seems to have been less effective in educating and molding them in the direction desired by the military authorities, although some of the army movies might have been useful in impressing Indonesians with the strength of Japan. Yet the propaganda was more significant in the sense that it provided most rural people with accessibility to modern entertainment media such as movies and radio. Those media enlarged their mental environment and surroundings and brought the people into contact with a larger society. Through the screen, they first saw the faces of their national leaders and the great capital city of their "nation." Through radio broadcasting they came to be more familiar with the events going on outside their society. This increase in the volume of information they received was one notable effect of Japanese propaganda.

114. "Propaganda in the Netherlands East Indies," *Sektie Krijgsgeschiedenis Archive* 059-22, p. 17.

Appendix I
Japanese Films Shown in Java

- (1) *Marei Senki/Tjahaja Dai Nippon di Melaju* (Malayan War Record)
Type: War documentary on military operations in Malaya
Produced: 1942, by the news section of the Japanese Army
Note: This film is notable for its depiction of General Yamashita demanding surrender from the defeated General Percival.
- (2) *Hawai-Marei Oki Kaisen* (The War at Sea from Hawaii to Malaya)
Type: Feature film based on military operations in Malaya and Hawaii
Produced: 1942
Released in Java: 1943
Story: About a young man, who after completing hard training at the Naval Aviation School, rendered distinguished service in the war. Many shots depict the intensive drill and physical exercise and emphasize the discipline and physical strength of the Japanese armed forces.
Note: The film was released in Japan on the first anniversary of the outbreak of war (December 1942), and earned 1,150,000 yen during its first eight days, while the cost for production and advertisement was only 920,000 yen. It was shown all over the occupied areas, drawing its largest audiences in French Indochina and the Philippines, and its second largest audiences in Shanghai and Hong Kong among all the films shown in those areas during the Japanese occupation.¹ In Java it was shown at 220 places by "mobile cinema" teams between July and November 1943.²
- (3) *Nishizumi Sensha-chō Den/Pahlawan Tank Nishizumi* (Tank Commander Nishizumi)
Type: Feature film
Produced: 1940
Story: About a Japanese military officer who was a very humane person and showed sympathy towards an injured Chinese woman and baby, but was finally killed by a Chinese soldier. He is described as a man who ended his life as a complete and ideal military man.
- (4) *Otoko no Iki/Semangat Lelaki* (Spirit of Man)
Type: Feature film (home drama)
Produced: July 1943
Released in Java: July 1, 1943
Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 12, June 15, 1943
Story: About the family of a shipping agent in downtown Tokyo. Deals with such topics as the dilemma between duty and humanity, and the confrontation between old ways of thinking and new ones.
- (5) *On'na no Kyōshitsu/Soeka-doeke Peladjar-wanita*
Type: Feature film
Produced: ?
Released in Java: August 1, 1943
Story: About seven girls (six Japanese and one Chinese) studying at a women's medical college. Describes rivalries, hostilities, and friendship among the seven classmates.

1. *Nihon Eigashi*, pp. 125-26.

2. *Jawa Nengan*, p. 171.

- (6) *Eikoku Kuzururu no Hi/Sa'at Inggeris Roentoeh* (The Day England Fell)
 Type: Feature film based on Japanese military operations in Hong Kong
 Produced: November 1942
 Released in Java: mid-August 1943
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 15, August 1, 1943
 Story: About a Japanese man, born and bred in Hong Kong, at the time of the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong. He is recruited by the Japanese Army and participates in military operations in Hong Kong, while his family is interned as prisoners of war. By describing the situation of this family from the immediate prewar days until the Japanese victory over the British in Hong Kong, the emphasis is put on racial discrimination and the brutality of the British towards Asians.
- (7) *Tsubasa no Gaika/Kemenangan Sajap* (Victory of Wings)
 Type: Feature film
 Produced: 1942
 Released in Java: mid-September 1943
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 16, August 15, 1943
 Story: About a man and his stepbrother who lost their father long ago because of an airplane accident, and who, in obedience to their father's will, become pilots and devote themselves to developing a new fighter plane.
- (8) *Hahakogusa/Panggilan Iboe* (A Mother's Calling)
 Type: Feature film
 Produced: June 1942
 Released in Java: ca. October 1943
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 18, September 16, 1943
 Story: About a woman who sacrifices herself and marries a man with two small children. She brings them up with deep love. Emphasis is put on her self-sacrifice and strong love for her stepchildren.
- (9) *Nankai no Hanataba* (Bouquet in the Southern Ocean)
 Type: Feature film
 Produced: May 1943
 Released in Java: late 1943
 Story: Describes men working to develop an air route in the Southern Areas. Emphasis is put on friendship, responsibility, and self-sacrifice. Note: Traveling teams put on performances of this film for *romusha* at thirteen places in Banten in December 1943, drawing audiences totaling 1,126,000.³
- (10) *Shōgun to Sanbō to Hei* (General, General Staff, and Soldier)
 Type: Feature film
 Produced: 1942
 Released in Java: late 1943
 Story: About military troops operating in Northern China.
 Note: On the second anniversary of the outbreak of war (December 1943) this film was shown at eight places in Jakarta by a traveling team and drew audiences totaling 104,000.⁴
- (11) *Shingapore Sōkōgeki/Serangan Singapora* (Attack on Singapore)
 Type: Feature film (dramatization of Japanese attack on Singapore in December 1941)

3. "Sendenbu Monthly Report," no. 22.

4. Ibid.

Produced: April 1943

Released in Java: after November 1943

Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 21, November 1, 1943

Note: On the second anniversary of the outbreak of war (December 1943) this film was shown at eight places in Bogor and drew audiences totaling 96,000.⁵

- (12) *Rikugun Kokasenki/Sajap Melipoeti Birma* (Wings over Burma)
 Type: Documentary film on the Japanese attack on Burma in January 1942
 Produced: 1942
 Released in Java: after November 1943
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 22, November 15, 1943.
- (13) *Ahen Sensō/Perang Tjandoe* (The Opium War)
 Type: Feature film (historical)
 Produced: January 1943
 Released in Java: after December 1943
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 24, December 15, 1943
 Story: About the Opium War in the nineteenth century between Britain and China. The emphasis is put on the evils of British imperialism which sought the benefit of Britain at the expense of the Chinese people. Chinese politician Lin Tse-shu is described as an Asian hero. Indonesian version of this film was made in December 1943 and distributed all over Java.
- (14) *Otoko/Djantan* (A Man)
 Type: Feature film
 Released in Java: after January 1944
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 2, January 15, 1944
 Story: Concerning a Japanese engineer who works in Manchuria to build a railway tunnel which is vital for the national interest of Japan. His heroic behavior at the time of a construction accident and the devotion of two women to him is described. Through the behavior of one of the women who lost his love to her rival, it is emphasized that service to nation is more important than personal love.
- (15) *Bōrō no Ketshitai/Barisan Mati di Menara Pendjaga* (Suicide Troops of the Watch Tower)
 Type: Feature film
 Produced: April 1943
 Released in Java: after February 1944
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 4, February 15, 1944
 Story: About Japanese and Korean policemen working together at the border area in northern Korea. Describes patriotic spirit through their fighting against bandits.
- (16) *Tatakai no Machi/Kota Berdjoeang* (A Town of Fighting)
 Type: Feature film
 Produced: February 1943
 Released in Java: after April 1944
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 7, April 1944
 Story: Takes place in a Chinese town in 1941. Describes friendship between China and Japan through a Japanese young man studying Chinese literature and a Chinese actress. Also described is the disorder and evil of the Chinese army.

5. Ibid.

- (17) *Shinsetsu/Saldjoe Soetji* (Sacred Snow)
 Type: Feature film
 Produced: October 1942
 Released in Java: after May 1944
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 9, May 1, 1944
 Story: About a love triangle involving an elementary school teacher and two women. Emphasis is on his devotion to education and the modest and compliant attitudes of two rival women.
- (18) *Kaigun/Angkatan Laoet* (Navy)
 Type: Feature film
 Produced: December 1943
 Released in Java: after May 1944
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 10, May 15, 1944
 Story: Describing the life of a Japanese young man from his entrance into the Naval Academy (1934) until his death in the attack on Pearl Harbor (1941). Emphasis is put on the training at the Naval Academy and the strong patriotic spirit of a navy man.
- (19) *Shusseimae 12 Jikan/12 Djam Seboeloem Berangkat ke Medan Perang*
 Type: Feature film
 Released in Java: after August 1944
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 14, July 15, 1944
 Story: Describing the behavior of five medical students on the eve of their departure for the front. One was conducting his last medical operation, offering his own blood to the patient. One was meeting his younger sister and asked her to take care of their old mother. One was attending a musical concert at the Public Hall. One was arranging a meeting between his elder sister and her boyfriend and urging them to get married. One was sitting in Zen meditation.
- (20) *Neppa* (Hot Wind)
 Type: Feature film
 Produced: 1943
 Released in Java: after August 1944
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 15, August 1, 1944
 Story: About a young engineer working for an iron foundry. He devotes himself to raising the working spirit of the laborers and in attaining increased steel production.
- (21) *Fuchinkan Gekichin/Torpedo Tempaan Djiwa* (Sinking of the Unsinkable Warship)
 Type: Feature film
 Released in Java: September 1944
 Reviewed: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 16, August 15, 1944
 Story: About two engineers working for a torpedo manufacturing factory. They succeed in increasing production by 100 percent, and with those torpedoes the Japanese navy succeeds in destroying the British warship, "The Prince of Wales."
- (22) *Sugata Sanshiro*
 Type: Feature film
 Produced: March 1943
 Story: About the Japanese creator of *judo* in the Meiji period. Emphasis is put on self-discipline and hard training.
 The first work by the famous Japanese movie director, Kurosawa Akira.
- (23) *Shina no Yoru* (Night in China)
 Type: Feature film (love story)

Produced: 1940

Released in Java: August 1945

Story: Describing the love between a Japanese sailor and a Chinese girl in Shanghai. The sailor protects the girl from molestation, and as a result of these adventures the Chinese girl abandons her hatred of the Japanese and becomes a supporter of Japanese Pan-Asianism.

Note: The film is unique because it has different endings depending on where it was shown, with different versions shown in different areas. The version shown in China ends with the wedding of China to Japan, while in the version for Japanese audiences the hero is called to duty before their marriage is consummated. He leaves his bride, is wounded by her countrymen, and loses his life on the battle front. On learning the news, she commits suicide by drowning. The version for Southeast Asian audiences, however, does not end there, but goes further: the news of his death proves to be false, and although wounded in the battle with Communist guerrillas, he returns just as she is about to throw herself into the river and saves her. The film thus ends on the happy symbolic note of Japan rescuing China, saving China from communism, and the two living happily ever after. (For details, see "Japanese Films: A Phase of Psychological Warfare," p. 15; also Anderson and Richie, *The Japanese Film*, pp. 154-55.)

(24) *Momotarō no Umiwashi* (Sea-eagle Momotarō)

Type: Animated film

Released in Java: 1944

Story: Taken from a traditional Japanese fairy tale, in which a hero called "Momotaro" fights against evil giants to save the villagers from their wicked behavior. Here the Allied Forces are compared to the giants and Japan to Momotaro.

(25) *Sora no Shinpei* (Divine Soldiers of the Sky)

Type: Documentary film on operations of Japanese parachute troops in Palembang

Produced: 1942

Released in Java: December 1943.

(26) *Tōyō no Gaika* (Victory Song of the Orient)

Type: Documentary film on Japanese military operation in the Philippines

Produced: 1942, by news section of the Japanese Army

Released in Java: February 1944.

(27) *Shanghai Rikusentai* (Army in Shanghai)

Type: Feature film

Produced: 1939

Story: About a Japanese Army company engaged fighting to the death in Shanghai.

(28) *Dai Goretsu no Kyōfu* (Fifth Column Fear)

Type: Feature film

Produced: 1942

Story: Espionage.

(29) *Aikoku no Hana* (Flower of Patriotism)

Type: Feature film

Produced: November 1942

Story: Romantic love story of a military nurse and her devotion to the nation.

Note: This film made a strong impression on the Japanese because of its theme song with the same title. The song became so popular that even forty years after the war, Indonesian informants would often sing it.

- (30) *Hanayakanaru Gensō* (Brilliant Illusion)
Type: Musical film
Produced: 1943.
- (31) *Wakaki hi no Yorokobi* (Joy in Younger Days)
Type: Feature film
Produced: June 1943.
- (32) *Aiki Minami e Tobu* (Flying South in His Plane)
Type: Feature film
Produced: September 1943, under supervision of the Army Aviation Corps Headquarters
Story: Praise of Army Air Troops.
- (33) *Kachidoki Ondo* (Song of Victory)
Type: Feature film
Produced: January 1944.
- (34) *Ano Hata o Ute* (Fire on That Flag!)
Type: Feature film
Produced: February 1944 (shooting done in the Philippines, joined by Filipino actors)
Story: Dramatization of the fighting, emphasizing the brutality of the US Army, and on the other hand, the humanity of the Japanese Army. With a symbolic scene of the American flag taken down and the Japanese flag hoisted, the Japanese role as a liberator is emphasized.
- (35) *Suihei San* (Sailor)
Type: Feature film
Produced: May 1944
Story: Propaganda for recruitment of sailors for the Navy.
- (36) *Teki wa Ikuman Aritotemo* (How Many Thousands the Enemy Might Be)
Type: Feature film (comedy)
Produced: August 1944
Story: About recruitment of the Boys' Aviation Corps.
- (37) *Kagirinaki Zenshin* (Endless Advance)
Type: Feature film
Produced: 1937
Story: About the antagonism and alienation in a capitalist society experienced by an employee in a Japanese company.
- (38) *Kessen no Ozora e* (Toward the Decisive Battle in the Sky)
Type: Feature film
Produced: September 1943
Story: About trainees at the Aviation Corps Training School. Describes them as the hope of the future.
- (39) *Himetaru Kakugo* (Hidden Resolve)
Type: Feature film
Produced: November 1943
Story: About the austere life of the populace in the back streets of the Ginza, Tokyo.
- (40) *Gunkan Minami e Yuku* (A Warship Going South).
- (41) *Fuji ni Chikau* (Swear an Oath to Mt. Fuji).
- (42) *Kōjō no Tsuki* (The Moon over a Deserted Castle).

- (43) *Enoken no Bakudanji* (Enoken, The Thunderstorm Man)
 Type: Feature film (comedy)
 Produced: 1941.

(44) *Chishima* (Koeil Island).

(45) *Saisho no Ippun* (The First Minute).

In addition to these, there were also some other documentary and culture films, the correct Japanese titles of which could not be identified. Some of them concerned the following topics:

(46) The Japanese Red-Cross.

(47) The Enlightened Village (about the campaign against tuberculosis).

(48) The Campaign against Malaria in Japan.

(49) Training School of Sword-fighting.

Besides the above-mentioned films, it is quite likely that the following items were also shown in Java, although there are no sources to confirm this.

(50) *Marei no Tora* (The Tiger of Malaya)

Type: Feature film

Produced: 1943

Story: About a Japanese man who came to Malaya in prewar days and became a gangster. At the time of the Japanese invasion of Malaya, however, he cooperates with Japanese army and dies for the victory of his mother country.

(51) *Biruma Senki* (Military Operations in Burma)

Type: documentary film on Japanese military operations in Burma

Produced: 1942.

Sources

- * *Djawa Baroe* (popular fortnightly magazine). This introduced, in almost every issue, new dramatic and culture films with detailed descriptions of their contents.
- * *Jawa Nenkan*, p. 170. This gives the titles and brief contents of movies made in Java prior to 1943.
- * Film collection at Stichting Film en Wetenschaap (Foundation for Film and Science) in Utrecht.
- * Temporary catalogue of confiscated Japanese films at the Film Archive of the RVD (Rijks Voorlichting Dienst) in The Hague.
- * Catalogue of confiscated films compiled by the RVO (Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie).
- * "Far East and World War II."
- * *Nihon Eiga Hattatsuchi*.
- * *Nihon Eigashi*.
- * *Senchû Eigashi Shiki*.
- * "Sendenbu Monthly Report."
- * *The Japanese Film*.
- * "Japanese Films: A Phase of Psychological Warfare."

Appendix II
Films Made in Java

- (1) *Kemakmuran* (Prosperity)
Type: Feature film
Released: January 1944.
- (2) *Berdjoeng / Minami no Ganbô* (Fighting)
Type: Feature film
Released: March 1944
Main theme: Devotion and service to nation
Story: About a young man who joins the *heihô* and his two friends and a girlfriend.
The first film totally produced by Indonesians only.
- (3) *Kris Poesaka* (Inherited Sword)
Main theme: Political theme of "common prosperity in Asia"
Story: Advocacy of unification of Asian nations under the leadership of Japan, a nation of the "Sun," emphasizing that all Asian nations are common in origin and equal in worshipping the Sun.
- (4) *Gelombang* (Wave)
Type: Musical film
Main theme: Political theme of "common prosperity in Asia." Describes historical development of the Indonesian people, emphasizing Japan's role in saving Indonesia from Western rule.
- (5) *Toekang Ngobrol/Oshaberi Pak Kromo* (Talkative Uncle Kromo)
Type: Puppet-show
Released: December 1943
Main theme: Counterespionage precautions
Story: A talkative man, Kromo, unconsciously gives information to an enemy spy and causes a serious situation.
- (6) *Tonari Gumi I* (Neighborhood Associations)
Type: Culture film
Released: 1944
Main theme: Political propaganda providing social education
Content: Propaganda film emphasizing the merit of neighborhood associations through introduction of their various activities.
- (7) *Tonari Gumi II* (Neighborhood Associations)
Type: Culture film
Main theme: Political propaganda providing social education
Content: Propaganda film introducing various activities of tonarigumi.
- (8) *Kerdja dengan Gembira* (Work with Joy)
Type: Culture film
Main theme: Economic propaganda
Content: Encourages diligence in daily life by introducing industrial and agricultural activities in various parts of Java.
- (9) *Pemakaran Tombak Bambu/Takeyari Jutsu* (Bamboo Spears)
Type: Culture film
Released: 1943
Main theme: Skills instruction
Content: Teaches how to use a bamboo-spear. Also introduces Japanese battle tactics.

- (10) *Asia Raya* (Greater Asia)
 Type: Culture film
 Main theme: Political propaganda on Japan's role in Asia
 Content: Propaganda film introducing Japanese military achievements through severe fighting in China and other areas. Emphasizes that the Japanese Army does not act aggressively and its purpose is to bring the liberation of Greater Asia by showing a scene of Indonesians and Japanese having a big open-air party.
- (11) *Indonesia Raya* (Great Indonesia)
 Type: Culture film
 Released: after September 1944
 Content: Film with purpose of teaching the Indonesian national anthem, "Indonesia Raya." The song sounds all through the movie as background music while showing various scenes exalting the national spirit such as Borobudur, mass meetings and parades, the Great Mosque, Peta garrisons, etc. In the middle of the film there is a scene of people in September 1944 shouting for joy at the promise of Independence.
- (12) *AIUEO no Uta* (Song of AIUEO)
 Type: Culture film
 Main theme: Instruction in Japanese language
 Content: Film with the purpose of teaching the Japanese alphabet, "A-I-U-E-O," to children. With the AIUEO song as background music, fifty Japanese letters are shown (animation) one by one. Then a scene of an elementary school, where pupils are studying Japanese.
- (13) *Taiteki Kanshi* (Watching against Enemies)
 Type: Culture film
 Content: Emphasizes the importance of patrols. By contrasting peaceful scenes in daily life with tense scenes of patrol activities and fire watches, the film shows that danger is always near to a peaceful life.
- (14) *Kepada Saudara-Saudara di Negeri Selatan/Nanpo no Tomo e* (To Our Fellows in the Southern Nations)
 Type: Documentary film
 Content: Introduces the life of Southeast Asian students studying in Japan.
- (15) *Boei Giyugun no Uta/Tentara Pembela* (Song of the Volunteer Army)
 Type: Documentary
 Released: January 27, 1944.
- (16) *Kinro Butai* (Working Troops)
 Released: 1942.
- (17) *Jawa no Tenchosetsu* (Ceremony of Emperor's Birthday in Java)
 Released: 1942.
- (18) *Bekerdja/Kinro no Uta* (The Working Song)
 Type: Musical
 Produced: December 1943
 Main theme: To exalt the working spirit
 Accompanied by theme song by the same title which is introduced in *Djawa Baroe*, no. 1, January 1, 1944.
- (19) *Pendjagaan di Oetara* (Guard at the North)
 Type: Documentary film describing the role of the Japanese Army in Indonesia.

- (20) *Pembasmian Malaria* (Extermination of Malaria)
Type: Culture film to promote the extermination of malaria.
- (21) *Kesehatan Badan/Genki na Karada* (Healthy Body)
Type: Culture film to promote health.
- (22) *Di Desa* (In the Village)
Type: Feature film
Produced: 1944
Content: Describing various scenes of village life.
- (23) *Di Kota* (In the Town)
Type: Culture film
Content: Describing various scenes of urban life.
- (24) *Koeli dan Roomusha* (Coolies and *Rômusha*)
Type: Feature film
Written by J. Hoetagaloen (the scenario won first prize in a contest sponsored by Rômu Kyôkai); introduced in *Djawa Baroe*, nos. 13 & 14, July 1945.
Story: Describing the difference between coolie laborers sent to Sumatra for plantation work in Dutch days and the *rômusha* of the Japanese period; emphasizing how the latter are well-treated.
First performed as theatrical play and then made into a movie.
- (25) *Menoedjoe ke-arrah Mengambil Bagian Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri* (The Way of Participation in the Government)
Type: Documentary film
Produced: late 1943
Content: Describing assistance given by Indonesians to the army administration from the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War up to the formation of Chuo Sangi In.
- (26) *Jawa no Ryogyôjo* (Health resort in Java)
Type: Documentary film
Content: Describes the recuperation of Japanese soldiers at Wonosari and Sukabumi.
- (27) *Djagalalah Tanah Djawa/Mamore Jawa* (Defend Java!)
Type: Documentary film
Content: Describes the activities of seinendan, keibodan, and Peta.
- (28) *Perdjoempaan Kaoem Moeslim Soematera Baroe* (Meeting of Moslems of New Sumatra)
Type: Documentary film
Produced: 1943
Content: Describes mass meeting held in Medan under the leadership of Hamka.
- (29) *Hari Pertemoean Dengan Keloearga* (The Day of Family Meetings)
Type: Propaganda film for recruitment of navy *heiho*
Produced: 1943
Content: Describes the day of family meetings at the *heiho* barracks.
- (30) *Ja'eshio* (The Song of Ya'eshio)
Type: Documentary film
Content: Announcement of the first prize winner in the contest for composing an Indonesian version of the *Ya'eshio* song.
- (31) *Sajap Baroe* (New Wing).
- (32) *Minna Genkida* (Everybody is Healthy).

(33) *Oebi Djalar* (Singkong).

(34) *Mas Soemobojong*.

(35) *Hudjan*

Type: Feature film

Produced: 1943.

(36) *Ke Seberang*

Type: Feature film

Produced: 1943.

(37) *Djatuh Berkait*

Type: Feature film

Produced: 1944.

(38) *Di Menara*

Type: Feature film

Produced: 1944.

There were several other movies made in Java whose Indonesian titles are unknown but the existence of which was recorded by the Dutch authorities.

(39) Planting Rice

Type: Culture film.

(40) Planting Cotton

Type: Culture film.

(41) We Assault and Go Forward.

(42) Training of *heihō*.

(43) Commemoration of the Establishment of Civil Administration in Java.

(44) Visit of Premier Tōjō to Java

Type: Documentary film

Produced: July 1943

Content: Describes his visits to docks, elementary schools, and mass meetings.

(45) *Rōmusha*

Type: Propaganda film for *rōmusha* recruitment.

(46) Native Participation in Administration

Type: Documentary film

Produced: 1943

Content: Describes the process from announcement of granting native participation in administration by Premier Tōjō at the Diet in Tokyo in June 1943 up to the formation of the Central Advisory Council in October 1943.

(47) New Life in Java

Type: Culture film

Content: Describes various aspects of the life and work of the Javanese people.

(48) *Djawa Baroe*, Nos. 1-8

Type: News film

Produced: August 1942-March 1943.

(49) *Berita Film di Djawa/Jawa Nyûsu*, Nos. 1-19

Type: News film

Produced: March 1943-December 1943.

(50) *Nanpō Hōdō*

Type: News film

Produced: January 1944–October 1945.

Sources:

Same as Appendix I, plus "Filmographie Indonesienne," *Archipel*, no. 5 (1973), p. 64.

Appendix III
Newsreel Topics

July 1942	Police school in Sukabumi.
August 1942	Arrival of Solo Kō and Yogya Kō at Jakarta.
September 1942	Athletic Meet of Ikatan Sport Indonesia.
October 1942	Training of <i>heiho</i> <i>Hari Raya Idulfitri</i> Completion of repairs of railroad destroyed by the Dutch Training in Japanese <i>kendō</i> (sword fighting) in Jakarta Celebration of the Japanese Navy in Surabaya.
November 1942	Celebration of <i>Meijisetsu</i> (Birthday of the Meiji Emperor).
December 1942	New women teachers at Jakarta Celebration of <i>Kō-A-sai</i> , one year anniversary of the outbreak of war General situation in Tokyo Learning Indonesian in Japan (at Kōnan school and Takushoku University).
February 1943	Japanese Emperor's visit to the Military Academy Japanese Emperor's visit to a military hospital Anniversary of the outbreak of war in Japan.
March 1943	Sketches in Java on <i>Kigensetsu</i> Day Training of Japanese Army in Malang Ceremony to topple the statue of Coen Japanese sea battle at Rennel Island The new school "Birth of a New Java" Monument commemorating the Japanese landing operation in Klagen, East Java Moslem meeting in Jakarta Opening of the Japan Club Meeting for Construction of a New Java Dedication of a monument (a fountain) commemorating the inauguration of New Java (Yogyakarta) Japanese Commander-in-chief and <i>Gunseikan</i> tour Java Propaganda campaign for the "Extermination of the Allies."
April 1943	Emperor's birthday in Java "Destroy English and America!" (Speech of <i>Sendenbuchō</i>)

- Birth of *keibōdan*
 Reopening of Jakarta Medical College
 Completion of repairs of the Tangerang bridge
 Birth of Magelang Renseijo
 Birth of *seinendan*.
- May 1943 Ceremony of completion of new ship
 Painting exhibition by Indonesian artists
 Fishery by Japanese Army
 Cultivation of cotton
 Inspection by 16th Army Commander and by new *Gunseikan*
Pasar Malam (Night Market) in Jakarta
 Road construction
 Military training of Indonesian women
 Training of *heihō*.
- June 1943 Arrival of new *Gunseikan*
 Sketches of Japanese industries
 Indonesian women learning Japanese customs
 Java defended by the inhabitants.
- July 1943 Premier Tōjō's visit to Java
Barisan Bekerdja (Labor Troops), with the song, "Work, work,
 for the extermination of English and America"
 Sailor training school at Singapore
 "Let's clean the well!" (Health Campaign).
- October 1943 Opening of the Central Advisory Council
 "Work for intensifying military power!"
 Recruitment of Peta
 "People's Health Day"
 Peta officer candidates enter training school
 Sketches of various places in Java
Seinendan training in Surabaya
 Construction of air raid shelter on the island of Timor
 Mass meeting at Gambir Square in Jakarta
 All Java Athletic meeting.
- December 1943 Fierce air battle
 Southern topics
 Appointment of native *shūchōkan* (Residents)
 Sketches on December 8
 Ceremony of *Kō-A-sai* in Jakarta, Surabaya, Sumatra, and Singapore
 Soekarno returns
 Enthusiasm and unity of 5,000,000 in Solo.
- January 1944 Opening of the second session of the *Chōō Sangi-in* in Java
 Presenting of colors to Peta corps
 Progress made by the Asiatic people
Kinrō Hōshi (Voluntary Labor) by high school students
 Planting of cotton by Prince of Solo and his wife and teaching
 of the planting of rice by the Mangkunegara Prince
 The Japanese Commander-in-chief and the *Gunseikan* visit a
 tonarigumi meeting
 Propaganda for food production increase and delivery of the
 product, and a Japanese shows how to plant rice
 Training of *keibōdan*, *seinendan*, and the Volunteer Force.
- February 1944 Installation of Sumatera Giyūgun on February 14, 1944, at Padang.

March 1944	Celebration of the second anniversary of the Foundation of New Java (Japanese Conquest of Java) First mass meeting of the Jawa Hōkōkai at Jakarta.
September 1944	Granting of future Independence to Indonesia.
October 1944	Soekarno joining <i>rōmusha</i> .
Spring 1945	<i>Takeyari Jutsu</i> (Use of Bamboo Spears).
May 1945	Installation of the Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence Training of Japanese <i>kamikaze</i> pilots Soekarno's visit to Celebes Japanese Emperor's birthday in Borneo.

Sources:

- * De Weerd, "Description and text of six cinematographical films (newsreels), I-VI, which were made by the Japanese during the Japanese occupation of the East-Indies, and were seized by the Allied Forces on entering Batavia in September 1945" (unpublished document at RVO No. 2760).
- * Collection of news films seen by the writer at RVD in The Hague.

Appendix IV
Theatrical Plays during the Japanese Occupation

- (1) *Setinggi-tinggi Terbang Bangau* (High-Flying Bangau-bird)
 Performed: April 1943
 Written by: Andjar Asmana
 Reviewed in: *Djawa Baroe*, nos. 1, 2, 3, and 8, 1943
 Story: An arrogant Westernized Indonesian young man, who in the Dutch period had despised "natives" and tried to marry an Indo woman, comes to realize his mistakes after the fall of Dutch regime and cooperates with the Japanese.
- (2) Not for My Sake (Indonesian title unknown)
 Mentioned in "Sendenbu Monthly Report," December 1943.
- (3) Revenge (Indonesian title unknown)
 Mentioned in "Sendenbu Monthly Report," December 1943.
- (4) *Kami Perempuan* (We are Women)
 Mentioned in "Sendenbu Monthly Report" and *Djawa Baroe*, no. 3, 1944, p. 32
 Story: About the Peta (Volunteer Defense Army).
- (5) Storm over Asia (Indonesian title unknown)
 Written by: Hakim, a medical doctor
 Mentioned in "Propaganda in the Netherlands East Indies"
 Story: Describes the reaction of intellectuals towards the Japanese invasion at the beginning of the war.
- (6) *Pandoe Partawi* (Scout of the Fatherland, Partawi)
 Performed: 1944
 Introduced in: Brugmans, *Nederlandsch Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*
 Story: An evil rich man, Nadarlan (representing the Dutch), deprives a good man, Pandoe Setiawan (representing Indonesia), of his fiancée, Priajiwati (representing native *priyayi* officials). Then the god of the rising sun sends Dainip (representing Japan) to encourage and help Setiawan.
- (7) *Fadjar Telah Menjingsing* (Dawn is Breaking)
 Performed: September 1944, to celebrate the formation of the POSD and the promise of Independence
 Introduced in *Djawa Baroe*, no. 19, October 1, 1944
 Written by: a Japanese screenwriter, Hinatsu Eitaro
 Story: About a young man, Amat, who tries to join the Peta and his family. Various topics such as black marketeering, *gotong royong*, and the grant of Indonesian independence are woven into the story.
- (8) *Samoedera Hindia* (Indian Ocean)
 Performed: December 1944, to celebrate the third anniversary of the outbreak of war.
 Introduced in: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 24, December 15, 1944.
- (9) *Moesim Boenga Asia* (The Season of Asian Flowers)
 Performed: December 1944
 Type: Musical play
 Introduced in: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 24, December 15, 1944.
- (10) *Bende Mataram* (The Mataram War Drum)
 Performed: February 1945
 Introduced in *Asia Raya*, February 15, 1945; Brugmans, *Nederlandsch Indië*

onder Japanse Bezetting

Story: Historical story of Diponegoro's resistance to Dutch colonialism (4 acts)

Profits of performance by Bintang Soerabaja and Tjahaja Timoer were contributed to the war fund.

- (11) *Boenga Rampai Djawa Baroe* (The Flower Spreading New Java)
 Performed: March 1945 to commemorate the third anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Java.
 Introduced in: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 7, 1945
 Story: Describing chronologically events after the defeat of Dutch until 1945. 14 scenes.
- (12) *Hantoe Perempoean* (Ghost of a Woman)
 Performed: March 1945 to commemorate the third anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Java.
 Introduced in: *Asia Raya*, February 26, 1945; and Brugmans, *Nederlandsch Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*
 Written by: Armijn Pané
 Story: A selfish girl begins to be conscious of a new life through tonarigumi activities.
- (13) *Iboe Pradjoerit* (Soldier's Mother)
 Performed: March 1945
 Introduced in: *Asia Raya*, February 26, 1945; and Brugmans, *Nederlandsch Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*
 Written by a Japanese screenwriter
 Story: About a young man in Tasikmalaya who joined the Peta. At first his mother is against his joining Peta but gradually begins to understand the importance of national defense and finally accepts her son's request.
- (14) *Kumichō Istimewa* (Special Kumichō)
 Performed: June 1945
 Written by: Ananta Gaharasjah
 Type: Comedy
 Introduced in: *Djawa Baroe*, nos. 11 & 12, June 1 and 15, 1945
 Story: In a certain neighborhood association, the *kumichō* (head) has been summoned for training and the *fuku kumichō* (vice-head) has gone for volunteer *kuli* work, and two ignorant villagers are suddenly appointed acting *kumichō* and *fuku kumichō*. They struggle to cope with a series of problems brought by tonarigumi members.
- (15) *Hidoep dan Mati* (Life and Death)
 Performed: August 1945
 Type: Comedy
 Written by: Ananta Gaharasjah
 Introduced in: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 15, 1945
 Story: About a man joining *Barisan Berani Mati* (The Suicide Force). Emphasizing significance of dying for the nation.
- (16) *Gerakan Hidoep Baroe* (New Life Movement)
 Performed: March 1945
 Written by: Ananta Baharasjah
 Introduced in: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 7, 1945.
- (17) *Pentjaran Balik Selaka*
 Performed: June 1945
 Introduced in: *Djawa Baroe*, no. 12, 1945

Story: Historical story of King Praboe Wirakantjana of the Pajajaran Kingdom.

- (18) *Kuli dan Roomusha* (Coolies and Rōmusha)
See (24) of Appendix II.
- (19) *Djemabatan Garoeda* (Garuda Bridge)
Performed: May 1945 to commemorate Navy Anniversary Day
Written by: Armijn Pané
Mentioned in *Djawa Baroe*, no. 14, 1945, p. 24.
- (20) *Toeroet Sama Amat* (Following Amat)
Performed: 1945
Mentioned in *Djawa Baroe*, no. 14, 1945, p. 24
Story: Story inspiring the spirit of self-sacrifice for the cause of the nation following the model of a *heihō* soldier, Amat, who bravely died on duty.
- (21) *Dewi Reni* (Goddess Reni)
Performed: 1945
Mentioned in *Djawa Baroe*, no. 14, 1945, p. 24.
- (22) *Sam Pek-Ing Tai*
Performed: 1945
Mentioned in *Djawa Baroe*, no. 14, 1945, p. 24.

Sources:

- * *Djawa Baroe*.
- * *Asia Raya*, February 15, 1945.
- * "Sendenbu Monthly Report," no. 22, December 1943.
- * Brugmans, *Nederlandsch Indië onder Japanse Bezetting*.

Appendix V
Japanese Propaganda *Kamishibai*

Title	Theme	Issue of <i>Djawa Baroe</i>
Roekoen Mendjadikan Sentosa (The Neighborhood has Become Peaceful)	role of tonarigumi and harmony among neighbors	No. 5 (March 1, 1944)
Melipatgandakan Hasil Boemi (Increased Agricultural Production)	increasing agricultural production	No. 7 (April 1, 1944)
Nasehat Jang Bermanfa'at (Useful Advice)	promotion of postal saving	No. 13 (July 1, 1944)
Insaf Membawa Bahagia (Awareness Brings Happiness)	" "	No. 14 (July 15, 1944)
Moenoedjoe Kemenangan Dengan Giat Menaboeng (Striving for Victory by Actively Saving)	" "	No. 19 (October 1, 1944)
Ta' Ada Pekerdjaan Hina (There's no High and Low in Occupation)	moral teaching	No. 15 (August 1, 1944)
Sembadra dan Srikandi (Two Sisters, Sembadra and Srikandi)	describing ideal women in wartime	No. 19 (September 1, 1944)
Perboeatan Baik, Baik Balasnja (Good Deeds Bring Good Rewards)	moral teaching to encourage good deeds	No. 8 (April 15, 1944)
Radja oentoek Semalam (King for One Night)	fairy tale without any particular teaching	No. 9 (May 1, 1944)
Tiga Saudara (Three Brothers)	moral teaching of honesty and diligence	No. 10 (May 15, 1944)
Bawang Poetih dan Bawang Abang (White Onion and Red Onion)	fairy tale teaching honesty	(No. 16 (August 15, 1944)
Salah Tampa (Misunderstanding)	quarrel between two deaf persons caused by misunderstanding	No. 11 (June 1, 1944)
Dongeng Djoko Kendil (Legend of Djoko Kendil)	Javanese traditional story	No. 12 (June 15, 1944)

In addition, the writer has seen the following three *kamishibai* sets seized by the Allied Forces and now preserved at the RVO in Amsterdam:

- (1) Ibu Melati Jang Gugur (The Mother of Fallen Jasmine) story about mother of a *heiho* soldier
- (2) Pertempoeran Oedara di laoet Sekitar Taiwan (Air Fighting on the Sea near Taiwan)
- (3) Goeroe Jang Koeat (An Energetic Teacher)

Appendix VI-A
The Eleven Songs of *Seinen no Uta*

Japanese title	Indonesian title	English translation
Kôa Kôshinkyoku	Pembangoenan Asia	Building up Asia
Asia no Chikara	Tenaga Asia	Asian Power
Seiki no Wakôdo	Poemoeda Zaman Sekarang	Youth in This Era
Jû oku no Shingun	Barisan Seriboe Djoeta Madjoe kemoeka	Troops of 1,000 Million Go Forward
Sekai no Hate Made	Sampai Koedjoeng Doenia	To the End of the World
Daitôa Kessen no Uta	Njanjian Perang Matim- matian Oentoek Pemben- toekan Asia Timoer Raja	Song of Decisive Battle for Construction of Greater East Asia
Bei Ei Gekimetsu no Uta	Njanjian Membinasakan Kekoeasaan Amerika dan Inggeris	Song of Exterminating America and Britain
Jaesjio no Uta	Jaesjio	Fighting across the Boundless Ocean
Umi Yukaba	Oemi Joekaba	When We Fight on the Sea
Mitami Ware	Mitami Ware	We, Subjects of the Emperor
Dai Nanpô-gun no Uta	Njanjian Angkatan Selatan Raja	Song of the Greater Southern Army

Appendix VI-B
Indonesian Propaganda Songs

Title	Issue of <i>Djawa Baroe</i>	Comments
Asia Berpadoe (Asia United)	October 1, 1943	Emphasizing the strength of Asia united under the idea of "live together" and "die together."
Ke Pabrik (To the Factory)	November 1, 1943	These four songs had music by Simanjoentak, words by Desmail Ismail, and were made in a series, describing the life of laborers and farmers.
Di Pabrik (At the Factory)	November 15, 1943	
Di Keboen (At the Cotton Farm)	December 1, 1943	
Poelang Poelang (Coming Back from Work)	December 15, 1943	
Bekerdja (Work)	January 1, 1944	In December 1943 a movie under the same title was made, using this as its theme song. Music by Iida Nobuo; words by Inoe Kortopati.
Tentara Pembela (Volunteer Army)	January 15, 1944	Music by Simanjoentak; words by the Literature Section of Keimin Bunka Shidōsho.
Tanah Toempah Darahkoe (The land where my blood spills)	February 1, 1944	
Selaloe Sedia (Always Ready to Fight)	February 15, 1944	Music by Koesbini; words by the Literature Section of Keimin Bunka Shidōsho.
Kampoeng Halaman	May 1, 1944	Emphasizes fatherland Indonesia as a part of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.
Tidoer 'Nak (Sleep Baby)	May 1, 1944	Nursery song, in which a mother encourages her child to grow up quickly to join the war, and to serve the nation. Music by Iida Nobuo; words by the Literature Section of Keimin Bunka Shidōsho.

Tentara Pembela Bersiap! Serang! (Volunteer Army Ready! Attack!)	May 15, 1944	
Ajoenkan Paloe Bikin Kapal (Swing the Hammer to Make a Ship)	June 1, 1944	This song is accompanied by a gamelan, because the composer considered it more effective in order to stir up the working spirit of the laborers working at a dockyard.
Djawa Hookoo Kai	July 15, 1944	This song emphasizes the importance of "devotion" and "service" to nation in order to expel and destroy the enemy.
Membela Pabrik (Defend the Factory)	November 15, 1944	Music by Seni Soeara; words by Takashi Hirosaki.
Mares Seinendan (Youth Organization)	February 1, 1945	
Menaboeng (Saving)	April 1, 1945	A song urging the saving of money.
Hidoep Baroe (New Life)	April 15, 1945	Composed by R. Harta for the promulgation of "Gerakan Hidoep Baroe" or "New Life Movement."
Kirikomi no Uta	July 15, 1945	Composed by Koesbini.
Djawa Sentôtai	July 15, 1945	Music by Iida Nobuo.
Memoedji Amat (Praising Heiho Amat)	July 15, 1945	Song praising a <i>heiho</i> soldier, Amat, who died in the line of duty.

Many more songs were composed during the occupation, but only those with a clear propaganda theme have been listed here.